DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 279 031 CS 505 475

AUTHOR Kleinwachter, Wolfgang, Ed.; Nordenstreng, Kaarle, Ed.
TITLE International Communication and Confidence-Building in Europe. Report of the Leipzig-Tampere Seminar on Confidence-Building in the Non-Military Field (1st, Leipzig, East Germany, May 14-15, 1986). Publications Series B. 20/1986
INSTITUTION Tampere Univ. (Finland). Inst. of Journalism and Mass Communication.
REPORT NO ISBN-951-44-2003-9
PUB DATE 86
NOTE 139p.
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120) -- Collected Works - General (020) -- Reports - Descriptive (141)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC06 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Audience Analysis; *Foreign Countries; Information Technology; International Cooperation; *International Relations; *Mass Media Effects; Media Research; Nuclear Warfare; Peace; Political Attitudes; *Public Opinion; *Technological Advancement; *Telecommunications
IDENTIFIERS Europe; *International Communication

ABSTRACT

Focusing on the role of the international mass media, these essays stress the urgency of building confidence in the relations among European states and populations in order to secure peace on a world-wide scale and to stop the arms race on the earth and prevent its extension to outer space. Titles and authors are as follows: (1) "Welcoming Speech Delivered by the Rector of the Karl Marx University" (L. Rathmann); (2) "Opening Remarks" (K. Nordenstreng); (3) "Legal Aspects in the Historical Development of Mass Media in International Relations" (W. Poeggel); (4) "International Confidence through Communication--Hazards, Alternatives" (Y. Littunen); (5) "New Communication Technologies and the Perspectives of Confidence-Building Measures in the Field of International Information" (W. Kleinwachter); (6) "Promoting Peace and Reducing Conflict" (T. Varis); (7) "New Thinking in the Nuclear Age and Confidence-Building in Communication" (H. Protsch and W. Ullmann); (8) "Culture, Information and Confidence-Building in Europe" (F. Raaz); (9) "Remarks on New Information Technologies (NITs) Bypassing Content-Related Regulatory Approaches of Communication Policies" (F. M. Bahr); (10) "The League of Nations and the Mass Media: The Rediscovery of a Forgotten Story" (K. Nordenstreng and T. Seppa); (11) "The Prohibition of War and Racial Propaganda under International Law" (H. J. Heintze); (12) "International Legal Regulation of the Direct Television Broadcastings and the Establishment of Confidence in Europa" (E. Konstantinov); (13) "Working Conditions of Journalists" (O. Miettinen); (14) "Television Programmes on Offer in Some European Socialist Countries" (Z. Jakab); and (15) "The Involvement of the Mass Media in the Campaign for Arms Limitation, Disarmament and Peace" (D. Riedel and H. Odermann). (JD)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Julkaisuja — Sarja B
Publications — Series

ED279031

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

X This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

Wolfgang Kleinwächter & Kaarle Nordenstreng (ed.)

20/1986

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN EUROPE

Report of the first Leipzig-Tampere seminar on confidence-building in the non-military field, Leipzig 14-15 May 1986

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Pertti Hemanus

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

CS 505475

TAMPEREEN YLIOPISTO • TIEDOTUSOPIN LAITOS
UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE
DEPARTMENT OF JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION

Kleinwächter, Wolfgang & Nordenstreng, Kaarle (ed.)

International communication and confidence-building in Europe : report of the first Leipzig-Tampere seminar on confidence-building in the non-military field, Leipzig 14-15 May 1986 / ed. by Wolfgang Kleinwächter & Kaarle Nordenstreng. - Tampere : Tampereen yliopisto, 1986. - 138 s. - (Tampereen yliopisto. Tiedotusopin laitos. Julkaisuja. Sarja B, ISSN 0358-4151 ; 20/1986
ISBN 951-44-2003-9

This report includes the papers presented at the first seminar on confidence-building in non-military field organized jointly by the Karl Marx University (Leipzig, GDR) and the University of Tampere (Tampere, Finland). The second seminar is scheduled for 1988. The seminars are organized within the framework of cooperation between the two universities, and they are planned as a scientific contribution to the so-called Helsinki process around the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

	Sarja	Series
A	Tutkimuksia	Studies
B	Raportteja	Reports
C	Keskusteluja ja katsauksia	Discussion and reviews
D	Opetusmonisteita	Textbook materials
E	Bibliografioita ja luetteloita	Bibliographies and catalogues

ISBN 951-44-2003-9
ISSN 0358-4151

TAMPEREEN YLIOPISTO
Jäljennepalvelu
Tampere 1986

CONTENTS

	page
Introduction	1
LOTHAR RATHMANN Welcoming speech delivered by the rector of the Karl Marx University	3
KAARLE NORDENSTRENG Opening remarks	6
WALTER POEGGEL Legal aspects in the historical development of mass media in international relations	13
YRJÖ LITTUNEN International confidence through communication - hazards, alternatives	17
WOLFGANG KLEINWÄCHTER New communication technologies and the perspectives of confidence-building measures in the field of international information	25
TAPIO VARIS Promoting peace and reducing conflict	39
HANNSGERD PROTSCH & WOLFGANG ULLMANN New thinking in the nuclear age and confidence-building in communication	49
FALKO RAAZ Culture, information and confidence-building in Europe	53
FRANK-MICHAEL BAHR Remarks on new information technologies (NITs) bypassing content-related regulatory approaches of communications policies	62
KAARLE NORDENSTRENG & TARJA SEPPÄ The League of Nations and the mass media: the rediscovery of a forgotten story	70
HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE The prohibition of war and racial propaganda under international law	91
EMIL KONSTANTINOV International legal regulation of the direct television broadcastings and the establishment of confidence in Europa	97

page

OIVA MIETTINEN
Working conditions of journalists 106

ZOLTÁN JAKAB
Television programmes on offer in some European socialist countries 120

DORIS RIEDEL & HEINZ ODERMANN
The involvement of the mass media in the campaign for arms limitation, disarmament and peace 126

List of authors 131

INTRODUCTION

In the final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) the 35 participating states have acknowledged that "an ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in other participating states" contributes "to the growth of confidence between peoples".

Against the background of tension and confrontation of the 1980s, ten years after the Final Act of Helsinki was signed, it seems to be more urgent than ever before to build confidence in the relations between states and peoples in order to secure peace on a world-wide scale, to stop the arms race on the earth and to prevent its extension to outer space. Increasing recognition is given to the necessity of developing a new approach in the nuclear age which is aware of the responsibility for the preservation of life in our world as a whole. In this process the mass media both can and must play an outstanding role. International communication between states and peoples, which gets its orientation from the objectives and principles of the CSCE Final Act, can make a great contribution to building an international climate of confidence, which would facilitate the solution of the global problems of our time.

Therefore, a scientific investigation of the interrelation between international communication and confidence-building in Europe is more than a purely theoretical challenge. The Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Tampere and the Institute for International Studies at the Karl Marx University of Leipzig wanted this joint seminar to make a concrete and practical contribution to the dialogue between representatives of states with differing systems. Since confidence-building is a multilateral process the two universities agreed to invite scientists from several countries of the East, the West and the South

to their first joint Leipzig-Tampere Seminar on confidence-building in the non-military field. The discussion by experts from Austria, the FRG, Finland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Ethiopia, Iran, Nicaragua, Vietnam and the Sudan proved to be fruitful.

By publishing the most important papers the organizers hope to support the further theoretical elucidation of the role of the international mass media in the process of confidence-building between the states and peoples. In this way the organizers furthermore wanted to contribute to the UN-sponsored International Year of Peace, to the Communication Programme of UNESCO and to the third CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna.

The organizers want to express their thanks for the support given by Prof. Visakorpi, Rector of the University of Tampere and Prof. Rathmann, Rector of the Karl Marx University of Leipzig, who have made possible, by their agreement, this first seminar, which is to be followed in 1988 by a second one titled "International cultural relations and confidence-building in Europe". Thanks must also be given to the UNESCO Commission of the GDR, which sponsored this event. Finally, acknowledgement goes to Mr. Eberhard Friedrich, who performed the technical work of preparing the manuscript.

Dr. sc. Wolfgang Kleinwächter, Leipzig
Prof. Kaarle Nordenstreng, Tampere

LOTHAR RATHMANN

WELCOMING SPEECH DELIVERED BY THE RECTOR OF THE KARL MARX UNIVERSITY

Ladies and Gentlemen!

It is my very great honour and pleasure to welcome you all on behalf of the Academic Senate to this international seminar here, at the Karl Marx University.

The members of our old and venerable University are happy to accomodate you for the days of this scientific meeting. Be assured that we will do everything to ensure that your seminar is a complete success and that you have a pleasant stay at our Alma mater Lipsiensis.

Ladies and Gentlemen!
Our scientific and political work at the University is subordinate - just like your own - to that question of questions, namely, how to preserve world peace. The continuous piling-up of weapons and the insane ideas of the militarisation of space plague the international climate and raise the danger of a nuclear inferno which would destroy all mankind.
There is, therefore, nothing more essential than to create a coalition of reason and to strengthen the powers of peace. And if it were possible, as General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev has suggested, to rid the world of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 - then this would be - to use a word that Goethe, one of the most outstanding students of our institution lent to his character Faust, truly "the greatest ever achievement".

Your seminar feels bound to the task of ensuring peace. The question which you put forward, namely, whether international communication could contribute to a climate of trust, is really a highly topical one. At first glance, one tends to answer this question very simply with "Yes". However, if one looks more closely, it becomes clear that trust arises or distrust is stirred up, not so much by the actual act of

international communication, but rather by the contents of the messages exchanged at these meetings.
How to create international communication which builds up trust, what principles this should be based on and which objectives this should be bound to - these questions of your seminar are all closely connected with the basic problems of international relations. These are questions of the future, which are however becoming an ever-increasing international problem in the face of the rapid development of the new information and communication technology questions of satellite, cable and computer based international communication, the international regulation of which is in the mutual interests of all countries.

The mass media declaration adopted by the UN General Conference obliges the information media to both contribute to peace and understanding and also to encourage the furtherance of human rights and actively fight war-mongering, apartheid and racism.
It is necessary to remind ourselves of this, particularly this year, which has been declared the International Year of Peace by the UN, but in which there have been several dangerous international crises caused mainly by the USA.

I am certain that the results of your seminar will make a contribution to the UN year of peace. The results of your seminar will also be of interest, to the 3rd conference for security and cooperation in Europe, which begins in Vienna in September of this year.

And of course, your ideas, suggestions and recommendations will also undoubtedly enrich UNESCO's work, especially programmes III "Communication working for people" and XIII "Peace and international understanding, Human rights and Peoples' rights".
It is with reason that the UNESCO Commission of the GDR undertook patronage of this conference for which we would like to sincerely thank them.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

At the recent XIth Party Congress of the SUPG, General Secretary of the SUPG, Erich Honecker, affirmed the dialogue policy of the GDR. He urged us, in the face of the threatening increasing gravity of the international situation, not to persist in the thought patterns of confrontation and the striving for military superiority, but instead, to approach things in a new way and to find new ways and methods in relations between the different social systems, countries and regions.

This demand is absolutely without doubt also directed at the development of relations between universities from countries with different social systems. As far as this is concerned, we have for a long time had very successful relations between Tampere University and the Karl Marx University in Leipzig. This past experience has encouraged us to make a further step in the field of peace and conflict research in the form of joint seminars. We hope that this idea of arranging joint seminars about the problems of confidence-building in international relations proves to be a productive and viable one.

As this problem of confidence-building is, especially in Europe, not a bi- but multi-lateral matter, we welcomed the organizers' decision to invite experts from other European countries to participate in this scientific dialogue.

I wish you all much success for your seminars and hope that this first Leipzig-Tampere Seminar on confidence-building in the non-military field will soon lead to many more.

KAARLE NORDENSTRENG

OPENING REMARKS

Dear colleagues and friends,

I first wish to express on behalf of the Rector of the University of Tampere, Jarmo Visakorpi, the best regards of the Finnish side to this first concrete step in cooperation between the two universities. The agreement between our two universities has been in force now for some years. So far it has been implemented through mutual visits and contacts. But on the other hand, we are interested in more concrete and effective cooperation and thus this first seminar in a hopefully long and fruitful series of seminars is very much welcomed by the University of Tampere - as we understand it is also welcomed by the host institution today.

The two small countries, GDR and Finland, with different historical and political backgrounds, are equally devoted to the interests for peace and confidence-building measures, be that through official European forums such as the Stockhom Conference, which is still going on, and the forthcoming Vienna follow-up meeting of Helsinki, or be that through such non-governmental and scientific forums as the seminar we are now beginning.

To begin with this morning, I think it is natural for a Finnish speaker to go back to the Final Act of Helsinki. As you know, in the preamble paragraph for the Third Basket of the Final Act, there is this well-known introductory sentence, where the 35 participating states express their desire "to contribute to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples and to the spiritual enrichment of the human personality without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion". So this is an overall desire. Subordinated to that, under the chapter of Information, one of the four subchapters in the Third Basket, is another introductory preamble passage where we have, among others, two vital sentences. Firstly, the participating states express that they are "conscious of the need for an ever wider

knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in other participating States", and secondly, next to that, they are "acknowledging the contribution of this process", namely to become ever better acquainted with various aspects of life in other participating States, "to the growth of confidence between peoples".

This construction of sentences introduces us to a rather fundamental philosophical and political and even academic avenue. Namely, here we have a balance between two fundamental approaches to communication as part of international relations. On the one hand, there is a stress that international confidence and peace - as so to say overriding political objectives - are a precondition for better mutual communication; that only under peaceful conditions proper communication can prevail. But on the other hand, there is also recognition of a different kind of philosophical point of view, namely the approach whereby knowledge itself - better knowledge of various aspects of life in other countries - will contribute to peace and confidence between peoples. These two approaches have their well-known political constituencies in the international community, whereby the information-for-its-own-sake approach, so to say, is strongly held within the Western camp, and the other peace-and-security related approach to information is more close to the socialist community.

However, the Helsinki Final Act, if we carefully analyze the nuances of the Third Basket formulations, makes a kind of amalgamation, or if you like compromise, between these two aspects. This is a carefully constructed balance which often has been overlooked by even experts of international communication, especially in the Western lobbies, where often the Helsinki Final Act is understood as a so-called human rights instrument, whereby the abstract notion of freedom of information is understood to be granted without any conditions whatsoever. On the other hand, in the other camp we sometimes hear voices which disregard completely the value of objective information as an essential and vital

element in the confidence building. The Helsinki Final Act is a balanced construct between these various aspects, and I think that seminars like this should devote more attention to a cool and academic analysis of these various aspects and their practical consequences to mass media and journalists.

I have written a year ago, for the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, an appreciation of what was performed during the ten years since the famous signing of the Final Act, and Oiva Miettinen has written a supplementary text concerning the particular aspect of working conditions of journalists. Let me just point out that my overall outcome in this review was that in fact very little progress has happened since the '75 signing of the Final Act.

We can say very roughly that as far as the actual coverage of the media of international affairs is concerned both in broadcasting and press media the situation seemed to remain roughly the same as ten years earlier. This conclusion is based on a number of observations and even systematic content analysis studies, including a major survey of television programme flows, which was done by Tapio Varis and the summary of which will be distributed to you on this occasion.

On the other hand, at the level of doctrines, the normative thinking about communication, there seems to have happened a major positive development since the Helsinki Final Act. This might first sound rather surprising, because we know that the years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act have been a period of deterioration of international relations in world history. However, paradoxical is that at least as far as mass media expert circles and journalist organizations, both national and international, are concerned, there has been a positive development. Landmarks in this positive development are first of all the Mass Media Declaration of Unesco, and another document prepared by the professional community of journalists in 1983, called International Principles of Professional Ethics in Journalism.

This document was prepared on a very broad international and political basis and in fact it constitutes the first time ever that the professional community of journalists in the world has articulated its philosophical and ethical approach to communications.

Let me quote to you one of its ten principles (No.8):

"A true journalist stands for the universal values of humanism and participates actively in the social transformation towards the democratic betterment of society and contributes through dialogue to a climate of confidence in international relations conducive to peace and justice everywhere, to détente, disarmament and national development."

For those coming from the developing countries and the socialist countries this might not sound such a revolutionary position, but those journalists who have stayed in the Western hemisphere, this is really remarkable - quite different from the customary, technocratic viewpoint of a journalistic profession.

Now, I have commented this kind of a new approach a year ago at the UN Committee on Information in New York. In addressing the Committee I said after quoting this same sentence the following: "We are not afraid (namely we professional journalists) of combining freedom with such a responsibility that is dedicated to what might be called the United Nations ideology." That kind of approach to universal values of humanism, which was formulated in this ethical document, indeed can be called the United Nations ideology. It doesn't suggest more, but neither does it suggest less, than is supposed to be advocated by the UN Charter and the other basic documents of international law.

Now, we are well aware that such a UN ideology is not held by all political or professional or academic circles in the world today; but it's remarkable that at least the professional journalists have been able to achieve in the early 1980s such a position. Let us note, however, that the US withdrawal from Unesco and the mounting campaign against the United Nations and against multilateralism in general

is very much felt in the international community today as shown among other things by the financial crisis of the UN Secretariat. And we know that behind this campaign is what might be called the free flow ideology; something that is in sharp contradiction with the UN ideology concerning communications. In fact it is quite interesting and important for us to note that this campaign against UN, Unesco, and multilateralism in general has been inherently connected with the campaign against the new international information order and against the Unesco Declaration of Mass Media and other such landmarks of this approach that I call the UN ideology.

I have been concerned myself over the past few months with the historical background of (a) this UN ideology and (b) this free flow ideology. They are clearly the main poles of the debate today, and even in the theoretical, academic analyses we can say that the terrain and problematics of international communication is somehow divided between those two poles. But how about their position in a historical context? What is the origin of each of them?

From the writings of Herbert Schiller we know that the free flow ideology has been generated by US Cold War circles, beginning the mid-1940s, and that earlier to that the free flow doctrine was introduced mainly by the Director of Associated Press, Kent Cooper, already after the First World War, and during the 30s the free flow doctrine was very much elaborated; however not in its present type of a Cold War doctrine, but as an American weapon against the British Empire. It was first a typical tactical argument in a battle between monopolies and only then transformed in the 40s as an element of Cold War.

What about the origin of the UN ideology? I must admit that up to last year I was under the impression that it had gradually emerged in the course of the 50s and 60s, especially after the entrance of the Soviet Union and the other socialist community to the work of Unesco and so on. Now it appears, however, that it is much older, and in fact surprisingly, all the essential aspects of the UN ideology in the

way it has been written into the Final Act of Helsinki or into the Unesco Declaration of Mass Media, or any other contemporary documents of the new information order, can be found already before the war in the proceedings and documents of the League of Nations.

This is documented in greater detail in the paper by Tarja Seppä and myself, entitled "The League of Nations and the Mass Media: The Rediscovery of a Forgotten Story". It is indeed a shame that we communication experts and to some extent experts of peace and conflict research have overlooked the prewar history for such a long time, especially in the field of communication.

As for ourselves, we have only started to study this history. Ms. Seppä has recently spent several days in Geneva at the archives of the League of Nations digging up documents which are not to be found in normal libraries - not even in the archives of former Member States of the League, such as Finland. For example, it is remarkable that a central element in the first disarmament conference in 1932-33 was the topic of moral disarmament and a central sub-element of moral disarmament was the media question, to the extent that even a sub-committee for the press was operating within the committee for moral disarmament in the framework of this first disarmament conference.

As a general remark I would just like to make the point that it is not only history for the sake of history that we are faced here. It is really a crucial exercise to the history of our own ideas, to the history of the doctrines into international communication, that we shall find in the League of Nations documents.

But what is also important and relevant to the contemporary situation is what happened towards the end of the League of Nations. First of all we all know that there was a Convention concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace. The proceedings of the preparation and adoption of this convention are highly interesting and contain a lot of topical information for our contemporary consumption - not

only concerning broadcasting but also cinema, schoolbooks and even war toys.

Highly relevant for us today is the development during the early 1930s - at the time when Hitler came to power in this country and the international situation in general also got deteriorated. A key to understand what happened outside the League of Nations is the book "The First World Disarmament Conference 1932-33. And why it failed." by Philip Noel-Baker. Here we find concrete information about how various lobbies operated in Germany, France, England and also the USA turning the public opinion, which was first generally supporting the disarmament conference, so that the conference was perceived more and more as a matter of controversy and gradually as a very doubtful exercise.

So at this crucial juncture of history we find a trend guided by the most militaristic and reactionary circles in the European forum. It succeeded to destroy nationally in Germany and internationally through the leading powers of the League of Nations, the liberal-democratic development and turned that development into the catastrophy which we know as World War II. I cannot help comparing this campaign with the campaign launched notably by the Heritage Foundation against the United Nations, in particular UNESCO. Both were carefully planned and largely financed by the same sort of military-industrial complexes.

Dear friends, we have a fascinating passage of the history of the 20th century in front of us: a chapter called the story of the mass media and international relations. Therefore I might admit that the topic of our seminar "Confidence building measures in the non-military field" appears to me today even more vital and even more challenging than it did at the time when we first agreed to make it. Thank you.

WALTER POEGGEL

LEGAL ASPECTS IN THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MASS MEDIA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A progress of detente, confidence building and last but not least disarmament and a peaceful competition between the two different social and political systems is not possible, if the mass media do not fulfill their very important role and constructive function therein.

As we can see in history, in particular since the first world war, one cannot ignore that mass media played an active part in the preparation of wars, especially by hostile propaganda.

Already at this time the states were aware of the potential role of mass media, especially of broadcasting, as an instrument of peaceful understanding among nations or on the contrary as means of war propaganda, that is to say a component part of psychological warfare.

This fact was the background for international regulations concerning mass media by treaties.

It is very interesting to find in a number of treaties stipulations which prohibit war propaganda against each other and any kind of interference into the domestic affairs of others as well. The following three examples have been chosen among treaties between the Soviet Union and capitalist states.

The first example is the peace treaty between Poland and Soviet Russia from March 1921. In article V of this agreement one can read: "Each party guarantees the respect of sovereignty of the other party and to refrain from each interference into the internal affairs, in particular agitation, propaganda and any form of intervention or any support to that end." (Handbook of Treaties, p. 218)

The second example was taken from the treaty between China and the Soviet Union from May 1924. Paragraph 2 of article 2 stipulates: "The governments of the contracting parties take obligation not to make propaganda against the political

and social institution of the other contracting parties." (Handbook of Treaties, p. 240)

The third example in this connection is the treaty on non-aggression between France and the Soviet Union from November 1932. In article 5 the parties engaged "to refrain from actions, inciting to or promoting agitation, propaganda or intervention against the territorial integrity or the political or social system of the other party." (Handbook of Treaties, p. 265)

These examples - and also other agreements - demonstrate that already at that time states found it necessary to prohibit hostile propaganda, because peaceful international relations and mutual understanding are adversely affected by such propaganda. The period of Fascism in Europe created a qualitatively new situation by the misuse of broadcasting for hostile propaganda, in particular against states which should become victims of aggression. Since 1933 especially the "Reichsrundfunk" started with systematic propaganda of race hatred and hostility against other peoples. The first victim was Austria. One can remind the well-known campaign of the "Reichsrundfunk" under the slogan "wir wollen heim ins Reich", intended to prepare the annexion of Austria. This caused Austria in 1934 to install jamming stations against the nazi broadcasting.

In the framework of the League of Nations these events led to the conclusion that it would be necessary to agree on a convention which stipulates the solely peaceful use of broadcasting. The "International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of peace" was signed at Geneva in 1936. It may be useful to quote article 1 and 2 which read as follows:

"Article 1

The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to prohibit and, if occasion arises, to stop without delay the broadcasting within their respective territories of any transmission which to detriment of good international understand-

ing is of such a character as to incite the population of any territory to acts incompatible with the internal order or the security of a territory of a High Contracting Party.

Article 2
The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to ensure that transmission from stations within their respective territories shall not constitute an incitement either to war against another High Contracting Party or to acts likely to lead thereto."
Article 3 stipulates that incorrect statements shall be rectified as soon as possible.
Article 5 underlines the important contribution which broadcasting can and has to fulfill in mutual understanding between states and in the organization of peace.
In our days this Convention is of a greater importance than ever. For this reason a number of states ratified the Convention in the last few years, among them the GDR, to which it has come in force in February 1985.
The broadcasting of the German Reich was integrated in the preparations and the strategy of the second world war.
At the Nuremberg tribunal - whose judgement was pronounced just forty years ago - ex-Reichsmarschall Göring said that there were three factors of importance for the warfare, that is
<u>firstly</u> the military force of the Wehrmacht,
<u>secondly</u> the economic war and
<u>thirdly</u> the propaganda. He added that the propaganda by the Reichsrundfunk was of particular importance. (Protocol of the Meeting from 15 March 1946)
For this reason the responsible leaders of the nazi propaganda were on trial at Nuremberg, namely Alfred Rosenberg, Julius Streicher, Baldur von Schirach and the chief commentator of the Reichsrundfunk, Hans Fritsche, instead of Goebbels who commited suicide before.
As a result of this experience of the second world war one can find the prohibition of any kind of war propaganda, of incitement to hatred against races or peoples in the United

Nations Charter, in the peace treaties of 1947 and in a number of other agreements. Since that time there are numerous legal agreements, par example on human rights, containing corresponding aspects. These will be subject of other reports.

To close, the history of mass media makes it clear, how they are dependent on legal regulations. Existent regulations show that there is a cogent correlation between the freedom of information and the obligation of the mass media to work in a spirit of mutual understanding, promoting peaceful coexistence between states and peoples.

The experience of two world wars and the threat of a nuclear war makes it necessary to put an end to the war of words via broadcasting and satellite. What is needed is solely peaceful competition between the two different social and political orders which has to take place in a spirit of mutual respect.

YRJÖ LITTUNEN

INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE THROUGH COMMUNICATION - HAZARDS, ALTERNATIVES

New Instability of Public Opinion?

Public opinion in international relations is often perceived as a stable one, structured by persistent images of other nations and peoples. Now recently, a number of signs would seem to suggest that public opinion climate in the modern industrialized world is becoming open to instabilizing forces, some of them instigating positive societal change, some perhaps constituting risks to democratic development in advanced industrialized Western societies, tending to become a matter of concern to all of us in the global community, particularly to nations which are economically, politically, culturally, and - we must add - informationally, most dependent on the stronger parts of the industrialized world.

Before confronting these new developments in perhaps more accentuated forms, let us look at them now, at their very early potential stage. We are facing a phenomenon that can be characterized as a modern instability of the public opinion climate.

Theoretically speaking, several forms of instability in modern public opinion should be expected. These trend expectations stem from changes in the role of knowledge in modern societies. Yet, they necessarily entail conflict potentials between each other.

The Current Instability of the Public Opinion Climate

The knowledge institutions themselves can, of course, and often do, perform information steering roles. But there are several reasons why the traditional knowledge institutions (science, education, mass communication) in Western industrialized societies have been hindered in the performance of information steering functions in society. The tradition-

al knowledge institution have had to face a new challenge - expansion and intensification of information in conditions of vast technological changes.

What we call information steering institution, should not be understood as a description of a formal, centrally planned reorganization. We need not assume a national or transnational chief executive who scientifically analyses economic and cultural problems, then decides to establish a new theoretical concept in information processes, and applies this concept to practice.

Thus, throughout Western industrialized societies, certain problems are exacerbated. There is a contradiction between two major societal, political, cultural, anthropological principles: the traditional principle of free-flowing information and the principle of rational, scientific planning. The mode of production in the Western industrialized societies maintains both free and centralized processes. (The free processes are often anarchistic and the centralized ones are monopolistic). To get a fuller picture of emerging changes in opinion processes in the conditions of the new scientific-technological turmoils, systematic comparisons of free and centralized aspects of such processes is needed.

In addition to the purely theoretical significance of the foregoing conceptualization and interpretation, there are empirical facts clear enough to demonstrate that contemporary public opinion on international issues, at least, does often fluctuate drastically. Furthermore, it seems that the maneouvrability of public opinion can be facilitated by institutional arrangements that connect actual societal tendencies with knowledge production and mass communication. These institutional arrangements are refered to here as "information steering institutions". Examples of such institutions are governmental or inter-governmental organizations, also with industrial backing from a liberal educational tradition to the established information industry.

At present, educational traditions in the Western industrialized societies are based on the established philosophy of so-called "liberal education". The liberal educational tradition has somehow survived its own internal contradictions, particularly those between its humanistic views and the competitive models strongly andvanced by liberalism. The result has been an education centering on the individual, with subsequent qualitative changes in the technological sphere and the political and economic structures increasingly uncovering the deficiencies of the system. Slightly oversimplifying it, one could state that the very economic forces which created the liberal education tradition are now destroying it.

Given the fact that the liberal doctrinary approach (also with its cultural implications), is constructed on the free competition of individuals and groups along darwinistic principles, it is not only human beings who compete. Also intellectual products, such as books, films, cassettes, teaching materials, etc. enter the struggle.

It has been assumed that , as with any merchandise, also in the cultural market the consumers choose "the best", so that the "best book", the "best film", and thus, in last instance, the best idea will "win". It is now clear that this is simply untrue. In the cultural market, products of rather questionable quality often achieve widespread attention and demand. The modern techniques of publicity, coupled with the conditions established by commercial competitive principles, do ensure that the "winners" are not necessarily the products with the best content, but the products profiting from the best marketing techniques and the best financial backing.

Apparently, the skills and resources connected with commercial and political merketing develop in a more systematic and reliable fashion than the means provided to the average citizen by modern education which would potentially permit the identification of bluff and reality in products from the information industries.

Development tendencies are difficult to research systematically. But there is no noubt that the strength of the information industries has grown. It has indeed been noted that this is the most rapidly expanding sector within the Western industrialized countries (mass media, advertising, computing, public relations). It expands at an estimated yearly 10 per cent, while other industrial sectors hardly reach half of this figure.

Taking into account material investments (such as telecommunication cables, satellites, computers, printing machinery, and electronic media) the production of the information sector already in 1958 rose up to one third in relation to the GNP. Although information industry however, is behind of this all, the trends are similar.

The societal orientation of mass media research today is a fact in most European, American and Asian countries. The earliest development stages, however, are limited to some few research efforts in areas such as Britain, France, Germany, Finland, and in Latin America. Other subsequent interesting approaches to contentual innovations in mass media gradually appeared also elsewhere.

Development Prospects

What has been approached for almost a decade or more is mass media education. Systematic appraisals on how the European mass media really functions have not been available to a broad public discussion. As early as 1974 mass media education was introduced to European academic discussion (Littunen, Minkkinen, Nordenstreng, 1974). By that time, three goals were asessed as global necessities in confronting the new media technology with its cultural implications which was not yet foreseen - but which could have been foreseen.

(1) The general problems of mass media education are not in the esthetic or audio-visual skills, but in the informational needs of large population sectors which also affect the systemic development of democracy in modern industrialized so-

societies.

(2) The content of mass media education should be designed to facilitate the citizen's awareness of his own needs and interests both in everyday life situations, as well as in the larger societal context. To accomplish this, it is important to analyse the control structure of the present communication channels, as well as the whole cultural industry.

(3) The success of any mass media education is limited to the scope of national cultural policy in general, most immediately, the programme policy of broadcasting companies. Unless a coordinated effort between educational and broadcasting policies is viable, meaningful results can hardly be exp ected in improving the culture uses of mass media.

(Littunen 1974, 11)

In 1978, UNESCO published a general curricular model for mass media education by Sirkka Minkkinen. This Finnish proposal was - and still is - unique, and needs only concretization.

In last instance, the criteria for the success of mass media education should be searched from the interests and needs of the citizens. This is theoretically reasonable, regardless of its clear ideological connotations.

In order to make attention to the needs and interests of the citizenry, a common interest is to find how to define the hierarchy of the privileges of the citizens and the different social groups. Since an even satisfaction of needs is obviously not possible, the material resources also determine the cultural resources.

So as to develop the contentual development of mass media education, we need an angle where different citizen groups can accept a dialectical independence and dependence between each other. A basis for this analysis already exists, largely in the way mass media education has been presented through UNESCO.

Peace Education

The UNESCO recommendation for peace education and inter-

national understanding views peace education as a part of a larger totality of education for globalism. This emphasized among other, international and global approaches to education at all levels and at all its forms; understanding and respect for all nations, cultures, civilizations, values and life-styles, including the local and foreign ethnic cultures.

Indeed, basic differences in educational ideologies create a number of difficulties while the nations attempt to reach for common goals in international culture.

The most significant differences stem from organizations, since already market mechanisms tend to be different in different cultures. Educational systems based on traditional Western liberalism are efficient in producing and sustaining the affluence of cultural markets. This, of course, does not exclude the fact that the Western cultural tradition does imply a largely uniform policy.

Confidence Building Measures in Culture

So far, the emphasis on peace education has been concentrated on school-age population. This understandable approach appears not to be sufficient. Children live in an adults' world. So we have to read that the international Adult Education Conference in Tokio, 1974, accepted a recommendation where it is stated that peace, democratic participation and favourable environmental surroundings are vital and a matter of principle for all human progress; and therefore, the conference recommended that member states and UNESCO stress education in their educational programmes to develop spiritual values, peace, international understanding, and cooperation and avoidance of all supremacy in international relations.

But while attempting to reach for peace education and overall internationalist education, it is necessary to proceed simultaneously to an educational and mass media development. Both controlled cultural mechanisms and international mar-

kets are unable to offer a long range structural development. Hitherto, mass media education which has been well developed as a plan (Minkkinen 1978) still awaits its implementation internationally. We have to repeat over and over again that the liberal principle of education requires cultural policy. And today, at the international level.

At any rate, the theoretical stuff is here. We only have to read what is internationally written.

The experience from nations has been assembled to a degree which allows the mapping of current and forthcoming problems and a corresponding tentative formulation of tasks.

1. Understanding of different cultures and societal systems, specially in relation to approaches which may potentially generate conflicts in international understanding.

2. Development of media cooperation, in which national cultural characteristics and sovereignty are respected.

3. Development of skills allowing critical utilization of informational material, specially through mass media education and adult information.

Meanwhile, recent plans for mass media education seem to serve either as first-aid instruments in alleviating the heaviest malfunctional effects of modern cultural market, or as an educational basis for long-term re-activation of creative and autonomous forces in culture. These group processes may provide us with the intellectual tools we globally need if we want to cope with all current problems we confront in our national and international horizons.

Mass media education can be effective in providing training and intellectual skills for citizens to perceive their cultural needs and to evaluate media products such as television programmes, magazine contents or films as fulfillers or underminers of such needs.

Cultural evaluation skills or trained abilities would, however, seem to remain highly inefficient unless new group

activities are emerging simultaneously. This is where different experiences of actually existing group activities should be carefully studied and put into further use.

The heavy challenges of existing and emerging global problems increase the importance of active search for Western cultural renewal. Regardless of what theories or basic concepts we may agree to use, one of the key issues are the relations between mass culture and near culture, the issues are the relations between mass culture and near culture, the relation between massive knowledge institutions and small-scale group activism. These are, in effect, also the relations between receiving cultural content and creating, reshaping this cultural content in everyday practical life. This is the meeting point of great international and even global problems and the face-to-face everyday problems of family, work, and neighbourhood.

And this is indeed where some of the focal points of peace and human progress must be tackled.

RECOMMENDED READING

Littunen, Yrjö & Minkkinen, Sirkka & Nordenstreng, Kaarle: Approaching Mass Media Education through Communication Research, Institute of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Tampere, monistesarja 22:1974.

Littunen, Yrjö: "Education, Mass Communication, Cultural Process from Liberal Education to Consciousness Industry", in Littunen, Minkkinen and Nordenstrneg, ibid.

Minkkinen, Sirkka: A General Curricular Model for Mass Media Education, Madrid, Esco, UNESCO, 1978.

Szalai, Alexander (ed.): The Use of Time, The Hague, 1973.

Varis, Tapio: The Flow of Communication Through International Broadcasting, Institute of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Tampere, monistesarja, 13:1973.

Vogt, Evon Z. and O'Dea, Thomas F.: A Comparative Study of the Role of Values in Social Action in Two South-Western Communities, American Sociological Review, December 1953.

Wulf, Christoph (ed.): Handbook on Peace Education, Frankfurt am Main, 1974

WOLFGANG KLEINWÄCHTER

NEW COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND THE PERSPECTIVES OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION

"Radio Broadcasting can contribute to overcome the sense of hostility between peoples" - Albert Einstein has said this during the opening ceremony of the Funkausstellung in Berlin in 1930 and he was right. But the historical experiences have shown that Radio Broadcasting can also be misused as an instrument to create a sense of hostility between peoples. The fascist Radio Propaganda was a terrible example. Sixty years ago Radio Broadcasting was only in the state of development. Today, Europe is one of the best equipped region of the world, in particular as far as the broadcasting media are concerned. There are 380 million Radio and 250 million TV Receivers in Europe. That is fifty Radio and 32 TV sets for 100 inhabitants, nearly three times more than the world average. But the problem of the role of the media in confidence building between peoples is the same one like 60 years ago. And even more, against the background of the development of new communication technologies the problem has reached a new level.

The combination of satellites, cable, computers, data banks, TV sets and telephones to an ever growing global network for interactive communication creates new potentials for a better understanding among the peoples. But again, it can create new problems and new conflicts.

I am referring here in particular to Direct Television Broadcasting via Satellite (DBS) and Transborder Data Flow (TDF).

Today, Europe is on the eve of the satellite age. More and more satellites are used to transmit radio and TV signals to national cable systems. The ECS1 satellite, launched in 1984, transmits now ten TV programmes including Sky Channel, 3SAT, Teleclub, Canale Cinq and Emi Musicbox, which can be received in numerous West European countries. But soon half

a dozen satellites will transmit signals directly to home receivers in whole Europe. Till 1990 DBS is planned by France/TDF1, the Federal Republic of Germany/TV SAT, by Italy/L SAT-Olympus, by the United Kingdom/Uni-SAT and by a group of Scandinavian countries. Austria, Switzerland and Luxembourg will hire a satellite or share a channel with other stations. Although all these planned activities are national activities they will have international consequences. A spill over is unavoidable, national programmes will cover other countries. Already in the next decade about twenty foreign TV programmes will be accessible.

The second problem is the transborder data flow (TDF). Computerization has changed the role of information in national economies and in international trade. Information is becoming a productive force, a resource, a raw material like oil. The growing information processing capacities, the introduction and expansion of data banks for the storing of information, the extensive demand for specified information of different kinds has led to the development of more and more complex networks for the transmission of information. The introduction of fibre optic cable and the possibilities of digitalization of words, images and voices have opened the way to the establishment of an Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN). All forms of communication (Radio, TV and electronic printing of newspapers and journals via great distances), telecommunication (telex and telephony) and datacommunication will be integrated into one Single Network. Access to data banks in other countries becomes a reality. If national networks in different countries are linked together, TDF will unvisibly penetrate frontiers. The ISDN will become, with the help of the satellites, a global network, offering the possibilities for a world-wide interactive communication.

Both DBS and TDF are challenges for the peaceful coexistence of the nations in the world, in particular in the European region with its high developed infrastructure it becomes

more and more clear that an isolated approach of a single nation state to solve the relevant problems is impossible. There is a growing interdependence between the states in a region and not only there, because each country will be affected to a certain degree by relevant activities of other countries. In 1930 it was possible to distinct clearly between national and international activities in the field of information. But already today and much more tomorrow this distinction becomes obsolete because nearly every national activity in this field has at the same time international consequences. Indeed, this fact has created a new situation. The spill over by DBS and the penetration of frontiers by TDF are new phenomenons, which gives the question raised by Einstein sixty years ago a new meaning. The question of the use of the media and in particular of the new communication technology is a question of a general political nature, strongly related to national and international security, economy and culture, it is a question of intergovernmental relations, a question of the sovereign equality of states. That's why a world-wide process in favour of the establishment of a NIIO within the UN-system has developed in the last ten years.

Whether the new media and the new technologies will create more confidence between peoples or they will become a source of mistrust and new conflicts will depend first of all from the political will of the governments involved. The new media can be used for different reasons. They can be used

- to mobilize broader masses in their active participation in the struggle for peace, disarmament and the solving of the global problems of mankind;
- to improve the mutual knowledge about the different aspects of the life in other countries and to promote mutual understanding and respect;
- to make scientific-technical and cultural information easier accessible.

But the new communication technologies can be misused as well. New dangers can arise.

There is a danger that the sovereignty of nation states will be undermined and that the new technologies will be misused to interfere in the internal affairs of other states;

there is a danger that the intellectual environment will be polluted and the cultural traditions and human values were threatened;

there is a danger that the existing imbalancies and disparities in the field of information and communication will be widened and that new forms of subtle dependencies will be created.

The new communication technologies and in particular the coming DBS and TDF are challenges for international co-operation.

It seems necessary

- to strengthen the awareness of the consequences of the introduction of new communication technologies and to improve the sensibility for the legitimate interest of all parties involved directly or indirectly;
- to clarify more in detail the aims of the use of the mass media and the new communication technology in an international context;
- to define more concretely the rights and duties as well as the freedoms and responsibilities of both the receiving and the transmitting sides on the one hand and the governmental and non-governmental actors on the other hand;
- to establish an international mechanism for consultation and cooperation in this field.

All these questions are key elements in the process of the establishment of a NIIO. They are also an element in the process of detente in Europe.

Eleven years ago the Final Act of Helsinki has recommended to intensify the international cooperation in the field of information. The aim of the information part of the so-called third basket was to improve the information flow between the European countries, to overcome the existing imba-

lances in the information flow, to free the information and communication processes in Europe from the cold war mentality and to create an international climate of confidence.

In the 3rd basket the 35 participating states expressed their consciousness that "the broader dissemination of information" will contribute "to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples and to the spiritual enrichment of the human personality". They expressed "the need for an ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in other participating states". They declared "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds" and "to encourage cooperation in the field of information". And they underlined "that this cooperation should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating states and set forth in the relevant document." Within this framework, the 35 states acknowledged: international information and communication will contribute, and I quote once more again, "to the growth of confidence between peoples".

The Final Act uses the term "confidence between peoples". This is a more general formulation. In the theory of international relations you have to distinguish between the governmental and the non-governmental level in the relationships between states and peoples. Analysing the problems of international confidence building this distinction has to be taken into consideration. Today, as a result of the development of new communication technologies and the growing importance of ideology in international relations, international information and communication has become a special subsystem of the contemporary system of international relations. How can those relations between the European states contribute to confidence building? What can the governments do in this respect?

Unilaterally they can use their own information agencies to distribute information, which is favorable to a climate of confidence. They can promote educational programmes for bet-

ter international understanding, in particular for the young generation. They can encourage the mass media under their jurisdiction to work in a responsible way, in a sense of mutual respect and understanding of other peoples. And they can combat, within their constitutional prerogatives, the dissemination of false or distorted news can be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of other states or as being harmful to the promotion of peace, cooperation and friendly relations among states and nations.

Bi- and multilaterally governments can conclude agreements on confidence building measures in the field of information and communication with other states. In this context it is necessary to say some words about the term "confidence building measures" (CBM). In the Final Act the term CBM is used for agreements related to military activities. But in the last ten years it became more and more clear that the agreement of CBMs is a complex process which cannot be reduced to military aspects only. CBMs in the non-military field are of a similar importance. Both, military and non-military CBMs are aimed to promote an international climate which is favourable to a stable peace, to disarmament and international understanding.

International information and communication determine to a high degree the international climate. Consequently, CBMs in this very field are needed. If you analyze the existing legal framework of the contemporary international law, there are already some agreements which can be seen as "CBMs in the field of information".

Article 20 of the Human Rights Convention from 1966 obliged the states to prohibit "any propaganda for war" and "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence" by law. It is without any doubt that if governments implement these obligations in good faith they contribute to the promotion of confidence building.

A second example is the UN resolution 37/92 from 1982 on the principles for international DBS. The resolution invites the states, if they want to establish or to authorize an international direct TV broadcasting service, promptly to enter into consultations with the receiving states with the aim to conclude an agreement in accordance with the principles of international law. It is likewise without any doubt that if a state desists from such a procedure, if it desists from consultations and agreements, it will create mistrust, conflicts and tensions.

How is the state of the international information and communication relations in Europe?

On the one hand, in the ten years after the Final Act something has improved. Contacts between radio and TV organizations, between news agencies and unions of journalists have been established. Agreements on cooperation have been concluded. New forms of cooperation have been developed. The joint TV News Conference between peoples in Seattle/USA and Leningrad/USSR is another fruitful experience.

On the other hand the imbalance in the information flow has even widened. Although the receiving capacity, as far as the broadcasting media are concerned, is nearly balanced distributed between East- and West-Europe - 182 million radios and 127 million TV sets in the East and 198 million radios and 120 million TV sets in the West - there is an one to seven imbalance in the information flow. Already in the transmitting capacity - if you take radio and the TV transmitters - there is an imbalance from one to three and one to five.

The imbalances in the flow are followed by an imbalance in the knowledge of the real problems and developments of the socialist countries in the western world. I do not say that the situation in the socialist countries in this respect is already ideal. But all empirical data available show the fact that the people in the socialist countries are better informed about the life in the west than vice versa.

Very often peoples in the western countries are good informed about catastrophes, conflicts and crises in the socialist world. They know everything about disasters and dissidents. But they know nearly nothing about the social, economic, political and cultural realities in these countries. They do not have, to use the terminology of the Final Act, "a knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life" in the socialist world. Many people in the west are full of prejudices, mostly underwoven with anticommunist stereotypes. Mass media are misused to create mistrust and anxiety. The cold war mentality with its slander campaigns and practices of interference is still alive.

Imbalances and interferences are undoubtedly serious barriers against confidence building in this field. Acknowledging that there are some movements towards more confidence, there are at the same time new developments which create new mistrust. I want to mention here only three points.

Firstly SDI. SDI is directed towards the militarization of the outer space. The outer space and in particular the geostationary orbit is needed for international communication. It is logical that SDI will not only create new political and military tensions but also new barriers for international information. SDI will become a permanent threat to the peaceful use of outer space, and in particular for international communication via satellite. If it is right that on the one hand the security of a state will be affected by a communication black-out and that on the other hand states are moving towards the development of space based national communication systems, than it becomes very clear that antisatellite systems are a permanent threat to national security. And additionally, SDI is a barrier against the development of east-west-cooperation in the field of information technology. The government of the USA has already announced that the COCOM list will be enlarged. And even west European countries make more and more the experience that they are confronted with answers like "classified information" or

"for Americans only", if their institutions want to benefit from TDF.

A second problem is Worldnet. This new TV system is designed to reach every household in the world directly from Washington. The establishment of such a world-wide TV system could be a good help to bring peoples together, to promote peace, understanding and an equal cooperation on the basis of mutual advantage and the principles of international law. But the present US government sees in "Worldnet" a key element in the psychological warfare against other peoples. International law is rejected as a guideline for Worldnet. The total "free flow" for American information is called for. Legitimate interests of others in this field are ignored. To quote Charles Wick, the director of the USIA, "Worldnet" has become the jewel in the crown of the administration's fascination with aggressive propaganda techniques. "Worldnet" is the wave of the future, Leonard Marks has said. Today Worldnet reaches the US embassies only. But there are already plans in Washington, to use the US radio station RIAS in West Berlin for a European-wide distribution of Worldnet. If Worldnet will become a television variant of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, a new source of mistrust would be created. A new barrier against confidence building in Europe would be erected.

The consequences of the commercialization are a third problem. The introduction of new communication technologies goes hand in hand with privatization and commercialization in the majority of the West European countries. The law of the market determines more and more the selection of the programmes. Not the "spiritual enrichment of the human personality", to quote once again the language of the Final Act, is the criterion, but the quantity of viewers. The aim is to reach the greatest possible audience at home and abroad. Programmes are determined more and more by a so-called international average, this is a computerized standard. National traditions disappear. More advertisement and less culture,

more entertainment and less information. But communication is not a technical or an economic process alone, it is first of all a social and political process. And it seems clear that the commercialization of communication will widen the existing imbalance in the East-West information flow. It will become a barrier hindering a balanced TV exchange between East and West. By the way, commercialization of communication is first of all favorable for the big transnational corporations based in the USA. Even in West Europe, in Canada and in Japan there is a growing mistrust against the waves of Dallas and Denver and more and more people are warning of a dangerous pollution of our intellectual environment, in particular in Europe, where world cultural traditions are at stake.

Summarizing it is possible to say that confidence will be promoted if governments

- further an information flow which contributes to peace and understanding;
- accept the principles of international law as the legal basis for the development of international information and communication;
- cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual advantage in solving all information and communication related problems.

In contrary, mistrust will be created if governments

- encourage the mass media under their jurisdiction to organize hateful campaigns against other governments, to interfere in the internal affairs of other states and to patronize other peoples;
- ignore the existence of legal principles, of duties and responsibilities in this field;
- reject an international cooperation based on equality, justice, mutual advantage and the principles of international law;
- erect unjustified barriers against the non-discriminatory access to and the equal participation in the information processes at the international level.

In conclusion, CBMs in the field of information and communication can be desribed as bi- and multilateral agreements between states with the aim to promote informational activities towards the creation of an international climate favorable to peaceful coexistence and to prevent unfriendly and illegal activities in this field.

Coming from theory to practice, you have to ask: Are there possibilities to conclude such CBMs against the background of the well known deep political and ideological differences and conflicts? On the one hand it is a reality that these differences exist and will exist as long as different social systems will exist. Between ideologies there is nothing to compromise. But the ideological struggle, which objectively will be further intensified, must not be an obstacle for confidence building.

In principle it is possible to wage the ideological struggle in a civilized way. Fundamental ideological differences must not lead to a war of words which prepares a war of weapons. Today a nuclear war would be the end of existence of the mankind. The common task to avoid a nuclear war includes in our time the challenge to think about new ways and forms to live with the existing ideological differences. The challenge is to wage the ideological struggle in such a way that peaceful intergovernmental relations, that detente and cooperation will not be obstructed.

Agreements are possible if common interests exist. Are there common interests in this field in the East and in the West, regardless of the ideological differences concerning the nature of the freedom of information and communication? If you analyze the existing and coming problems in this field without prejudices, there are at least five areas for common actions.

Firstly both sides have a common interest in a peaceful climate in Europe. It would be without any logic to be against a nuclear or conventional war but tolerant against a psychological war. A war of words should be avoided. De-

tente and disarmament should be promoted. In order to strengthen confidence in Europe, the participating states of the Final Act could agree

- to promote the preparation and distribution of information material relating to the dangers of the arms race, to the consequences of a nuclear war and to the efforts towards disarmament;
- to prohibit the propaganda in favour of the threat or use of force and in particular of the legitimacy for the first use of nuclear weapons;
- to extend the exchange of information between the European countries on peace and disarmament matters and to develop new forms of cooperation like co-production or joint video-conferences.

A second area of common interest is the legal field. On the one hand the already existing international law constitutes a sufficient general legal framework for international information and communication. But on the other hand new phenomena like DBS and TDF create the necessity to define the relevant rights and duties of the states in this field more concretely. The East European countries have proposed in the UN and in the UNESCO the elaboration of certain instruments. In West Europe there are now numerous activities to establish a legal framework for the new media. A resolution on DBS was adopted by the Council of Europe. A declaration on TDF was adopted by the OECD. The Green Book of the EEC "Television without Frontiers" gives numerous recommendations concerning the harmonization of the legal systems in the West European countries. Data production laws were adopted by national parliaments. But as already mentioned the consequences of the use of the new communication technology do not stop at the border between the two systems. Isolated subregional solutions are not sufficient to deal with the problem. In contrary, they can create new problems if they do not take into account the interest of the states in the Final Act could start with negotiations concerning

- a convention on DBS;
- a convention on TDF;
- a declaration on the principles for the cooperation in the field of information and communication.

A third area for cooperation between the two systems is the established of All-European information networks. European data banks for natural science and technology, for social sciences and culture are without any doubt useful for both sides.

A fourth area is the technical field. Problems like the use of geostationary orbital positions in the European region, the use of frequencies or the standardization of new technologies, in particular of the ISDN, cannot be solved without multilateral consultations and agreements. Although these questions call for global negotiations within the United Nations System, an European co-operation could contribute to more effective solutions in bodies like CCITT and the WARC of the ITU or the Outer Space Committee and the Commission for Transnational Corporations of the United Nations.

And finally, a fifth area for common actions is the cooperation in the field of communication development. The underdevelopment of the developing countries in the field of information is a challenge for both East and West Europe. By coordinated efforts and even by joint actions both sides could contribute to the development of communication in the Third World, and in particular within the IPDC of UNESCO and the Centre for Telecommunications Development of the ITU.

Cooperation in these five areas would contribute to the establishment of a new international information and communication order on the global scale. It would contribute to the process of confidence building in Europe and in the world.

The socialist countries are in favor of such a cooperation. Numerous initiatives in the UN and the UNESCO like the ela-

boration of a ESS convention or the establishment of an international organization for the peaceful use of outer space have been undertaken by the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and the GDR. In the complex programme of the CMEA countries, which was adopted last year in Sofia, the socialist countries propose an international cooperation in the use of satellites and computers for the establishment of global networks. At the 27th party congress of the CPSU Michail Gorbatschev has proposed to broaden the international cooperation in the humanitarian field, including cooperation in the field of information. Also the GDR is ready and interested to develop a constructive dialogue in this field.

The 3rd follow-up meeting of the CSCE, which will take place this fall in Vienna, could be a good forum to discuss all the raised questions. And it seems useful to develop the idea to convene an intergovernmental conference on communication policies in Europe (EUROCOM), which has been discussed by the last General Conference of UNESCO in 1985 and which could take place within the next five years.

TAPIO VARIS

PROMOTING PEACE AND REDUCING CONFLICT

Mass Media and Public Opinion

Much depends on the mass media and international communication in what will be the international political climate, accelerating or retarding such processes as détente, disarmament, and peace. Modern communication scholars agree that in recent years 'creating reality' has begun to vie with 'mirroring society' as the slogan to summarize the role of the mass media. According to this view, by looking at the mass media and their effect on public opinion, we not only learn to recognize what happens in the world but we also learn to recognize what societies are prepared for - peace or perhaps war.

When stressing the role of the mass media in solving social problems, it is far too easy to make oversimplified assumptions. One such assumption is a too mechanistic, one-directional view of the relationship between the media and the audience. Any research into the media and disarmament which does not take account, in some way or another, of developments in the theory of news values, studies of reporting conflict, trends in value analysis, the relative influence of fictional and non-fictional material, new approaches to an understanding of the process of influence, etc., is not likely to make any worthwhile contribution to the solution of the problems.

Another assumption is a general view of a rational society, in which decisions are taken and information spread on a predominantly rational basis. Karl W. Deutsch has asked whether we have an "optimistic" (i.e. rationalistic) bias in our approach: Does not the communications approach whitewash existing societies by picturing them as more rational and more capable of learning than they really are?

However, in the era of modern means of destruction one has to assume that there is enough room for rational decision-

making. Deutsch in his book "The Nerves of Government" (New York 1966, p. xii) describes the situation in the following way:

> "Since the coming of nuclear weapons, societies depend for their survival on the political sub-systems. The question of the life and death of nations, perhaps of mankind, has become politicized. Nations depend more than ever on the capacities of their political sub-systems for tolerance, learning and viable self-information. Whether any given political system, including our own, does have these capacities now, or whether it can acquire them in time, is again a question of empirical fact..."

One of the major political sub-systems has to do with media and communication. It is essential to recognize that the way this system works and its capacity, inter alia, for tolerance, learning and adopting new ways of thought are determined by the cultural frames within which it has developed and currently operates. What people think about other people and other countries, for example, are not simply rational or cognitive constructs. These thoughts are influenced by social and personal histories, tinged with good or bad feelings, and reflecting pleasant or traumatic memories. They may be characterized by immediacy or distance, by relevance to the self or lack of it, with poignancy, indifference or dislike.

The role of UNESCO was found to be extremely important in building "the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind" as its constitutional objective. The UNESCO constitution also stresses the importance of a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives:

> "The States Parties to this Constitution believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase these means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives."

In the contemporary international situation there is an urgent need for competent knowledge and analysis of the contents of the mass media, as well as contents of the mass

consciousness, in matters of the arms race, disarmament and related issues. This means monitoring mass media performance on the one hand and trends of public opinion of the other. Because of this, there is a need to create a permanent system among professional scholars active in peace research, communication (journalism) research, education and public opinion research, to explore these problems.

On the basis of existing research we cannot answer the questions as to how media coverage of disarmament-related issues affects public opinion or the disarmament process in general. While modern armament and disarmament remain to the majority of people in area of indirect experience only, it is obvious that the beliefs and mechanisms of social consciousness become crucial for the successful implementation of disarmament information.

It is possible to improve the use of relevant sources of information, including peace organizations and research institutes. The language used in media coverage should be critically assessed, as well as the use of audiovisual material. It has been asked, for example, why should a missile - a war machine - be used as a symbol for the activities of peace organizations.

The Group discussed in detail the conclusions of the UNESCO Symposium on "The Media and Disarmament", held in Nairobi, Kenya, April 1983 (Appendix to the present Report). Peace and disarmament research and education were found to be of central importance to the communication activities of broadcasters.

The Europeanization of Peace

The perspective of peace and the arguments about peace from a European point of view were thought to be highly important in today's world. The Group discussed the problems of confidence-building in Europe, as well as those of excessive secrecy and of openess in communication and information. The problem of how the media may be used in preparation for a

nuclear war was widely discussed.

At present, the concept of confidence-and-security-building measures (CSBM) has had a predominantly military dimension, referring to activities such as prior notification of troop manoeuvres, exchange of military observers, etc. But it would be dangerous to accept such an exact definition of a concept that has not yet stabilized sufficiently, and so by its very nature should be left open. At least three different functions should be mentioned that CSBMs should contribute to, in order to deserve the name:

(i) They should improve the general international climate, with a view to facilitating different forms of progress in the striving for arms control and disarmament, for example, by the reduction of tensions in the international system.

(ii) They should reduce the risks of war by increasing communication and predictability in an international system, so as to lessen the risks of acute conflicts being sparked off by misunderstandings or misinterpretation of the military and political behaviour of states.

(iii) They should contribute to arms control and disarmament by reducing the effects of various factors accelerating the arms race.

In the most general sense of the term, a CSBM is any measure that contributes to at least one of these functions, irrespective of what is the more precise nature of the measure, and independently of the way in which it is undertaken, that is unilaterally or multilaterally.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The peace researchers' community has widely analyzed the role of information and communication in the process of confidence-building and security. Some of their conclusions are summarized in the following paragraphs.

1. Traditionally the main communication strategy of states in the field of defence has been one of secrecy and threat. Even in those societies in which there is openess as regards societally-relevant information, an atmosphere of secrecy has surrounded armaments. To facilitate disarmament, a new strategy of communication on defence matters is needed. Traditional policies of secrecy may not necessarily bring about security: in fact, security may require the adoption of a communication strategy other than that of secrecy and the withholding of relevant information.

2. For the general public, facts about the suffering and the destruction caused by the use of armaments, about the future dangers of their destructive potential, and about the immense wastage of resources, are not well spread. Awareness has to be increased that there are constructive alternatives to the madness of the arms race. The concept of national security has to be broadened and disarmament discussed in terms of how human needs may best be met.

3. Lack of correct information stems from several factors and some government actions might be taken to improve the situation in these respects. Co-operation with UNESCO's programme for disarmament education is one example. Another example, with some historical precedence, would be reciprocal exchange of self-images for publication - states could agree to publish unabridged statements from other countries as to their perceptions and intentions concerning the international situation and could cover the costs of reaching an agreed percentage of national readership by advertisements containing these statements.

4. In several areas secrecy has become outdated. Many kinds of information about numbers, quality and deployment of weapons systems, units of armed forces, etc. that a couple of decades ago were only accessible through

espionage operating on the territory of the 'interesting nation', are today readily available through a plethora of technologies: satellite photography, new kinds of radar and sonar systems, telemonitoring, tracing, seismography, etc.

In conclusion, the Group emphasized that the promotion of peace requires reducing the risks of war by increasing communication and predictability in the international system. Communication may lessen the risks of acute conflicts being sparked off by misunderstanding and misperceptions of the military and political behaviour of states. Although the Group did not share the view that wars are generally caused by misunderstandings, it was felt to be vitally necessary to avoid misunderstandings by democratic debate and dialogue: both between countries as adversaries and among their peoples, because misunderstanding and false information contribute to the increase of international tension and the danger of nuclear war.

Report based on working discussion with:

John Burrows, Adult education lecturer, UK
Richard Clarke, Adult education tutor, UK
Richard Dill, Broadcasting administrator, West Germany
Björn Marthinson, Educational broadcasting producer, Norway
Singa Sandelin, Lecturer in education, Finland

PARIS 12 July 1983 Appendix
Original: English
Distribution: limited

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

UNESCO AND THE MEDIA'S ROLE IN DISARMAMENT

CONCLUSIONS OF THE NAIROBI SYMPOSIUM
April 1983

As part of its contribution to the World Disarmament Campaign, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly on 7 June 1982, Unesco organized an international symposium in Nairobi, Kenya, from 18 to 22 April 1983 on 'the media and disarmament'. Thirteen researchers and journalists from Finland, German Democratic Republic, India, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Peru, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, Viet-Nam and Yugoslavia participated in their personal capacity.

At the close of four days' discussion, the participants unanimously agreed that the exchange of views and experiences between media professionals and researchers holding different viewpoints had been fruitful for them and beneficial for international understanding. They recognized and respected their differences regarding the place of the media in society and the conditions for disarmament and security. In spite of these differences, they believed that significant progress had been made towards identifying the ways the media deal with armament and disarmament and the effects of the coverage as well as steps that might be taken to facilitate the tasks of the media and to contribute to world disarmament. They also agreed on the following principal conclusion and took note of numerous suggestions presented by individual participants and which appear in the narrative of this report.

1. The relationship between the media and disarmament

Peace and disarmament constitute undeniably crucial issues

for all societies; the awareness of the urgency of protecting and building peace and of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective national and international control is not, however, universal. The media contribute in an essential way to making this awareness universal. A better understandning of this role and increased efforts to respect the rights and responsibilities of the media may contribute to the objectives of world disarmament.

2. Influence of the media

The responsibility of the media is all the greater in the light of their capacity to influence perceptions of threat and contribute to the formation of attitudes concerning security.

3. Sources of information

The media must have free access to the diversity of relevant sources of information, including peace and disarmament research institutes in accordance with the rights of the public in all countries to know and to communicate about the causes and consequences of the arms race and the obstacles to disarmament.

4. Approaches to media coverage of disarmament

Journalists everywhere should be enabled to explore disarmament from many approaches, including the links between disarmament and development and emerging new concepts of security. In the exercise of their professional responsibilities they should also be enabled to use a variety of relevant sources and to apply their critical awareness to them in their constant search for the highest level of accuracy and truth.

5. International flow of disarmament information

The mass media should encourage an unimpeded flow of accurate disarmament information among all countries and should endeavour to use plain language. Special efforts should be made in the case of countries where comparatively little

disarmament information currently exists and where public opinion may be relatively uninformed. Where illiteracy is still a major problem, disarmament information should be disseminated through traditional means of communication and new technologies. It is essential that translations of disarmament documentation be provided in local languages.

6. Training of journalists

The complex technical and political aspects of disarmament demand high qualifications from journalists. With the help of the United Nations and Unesco, as well as appropriate non-governmental organizations the training of journalists should include adequate emphasis and information on disarmament. It should also encourage international understanding through such subjects as foreign languages, national and international law, methodology of news collection and dissemination, national and international economics, history and international relations.

7. The role of research

The actual and potential impact of media coverage of disarmament and related issues can best be evaluated through systematic scientific research. In order to promote international co-operation in such research, Unesco should carry out case-studies in a variety of countries with special reference to United Nations activities and resolutions.

8. Links between disarmament research and disarmament education

The links between disarmament research and disarmament education should be strengthened and sustained in as many fields as possible. Dissemination of research findings to a wide variety of publics will help create a more informed citizenry and thereby contribute to democratizing the decision-making process in disarmament matters.

9. Links between disarmament education and the media

Critical public awareness of the sources and contexts of media and research reports is important for disarmament education and information and can lead to an improvement in the quality of such reports. Unesco's disarmament education activities should be developed in order to increase the public's ability to evaluate and identify code phrases used in disarmament debates, distinguish between facts and opinions, and assess the selection of material in television and broadcast reports.

HANNSGERD PROTSCH/WOLFGANG ULLMANN

NEW THINKING IN THE NUCLEAR AGE AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN COMMUNICATION

This jointly organized seminar "International Communication and Confidence - Building in Europe" is absolutely in keeping with the times and cannot at all be underestimated in its importance.

While today the overwhelming majority of the people is striving for maintaining peace it is this peace which is in highest danger.

"The international situation has been exacerbated by the arms-buildung and confrontation strategy pursued by influential circles in the United States and NATO", the Secretary General of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUP), Erich Honecker, has stated on the 11th Party Congress.

In this situation mankind faces the question of its existence. In the nuclear age, that means by the existence of new generations of nuclear weapons of mass extermination and their accumulation a new world war would destroy the human civilization. There is no historical parallel in the whole development of mankind.

From that it follows urgently that today every man irrespective of his profession, his philosophy or religion, his class affiliation bears a heavy responsibility for the survival of the human race. Every man is responsible for the maintenance of peace. Therefore Erich Honecker demanded on the 11th Party Congress of the SUP "to approach matters in a new way and to find new forms and procedures for the dealings between different social systems, states and regions".

This new approach calls first and foremost for international confidence building. It is true, the military sphere is the crucial element of confidence building. But it is also true that the process of confidence building can only be successful if it includes all the spheres of international relations, if it includes the political, economical, scientific-technical and cultural co-operation and the humanitarian

field. That means necessarily that information and communication and here not at least the mass media should show this new approach and can and must make an enormous contribution to the international confidence building.

None of the hitherto existing information doctrines resulting from certain historical situations or different political and economical interests can justify nowadays that information and communication are excluded from the responsibility for the maintenance of peace.

Never before the Constitution of UNESCO was as topical as today:

> "That since wars begin in the minds of man, it is in the minds of man that the defences of peace must be constructed..."

Exactly this is the great challenge of our present time. Recognizing this responsibility the Warsaw Treaty Member States have stated in their Political Declaration on 5 January 1983 in Prague:

> "A lessening of the danger of war is not possible without the creation of an atmosphere of confidence in relations among states. This necessitates, along with the development of the political dialogue and the adoption of corresponding measures in the economic and military spheres, the dissemination of true information and the renunciation of great power apsirations, the propagation of racism, chauvinism and nationalist exclusiveness, efforts to teach other nations how to lead their life, the praising of violence and to arouse war psychosis ... Conscious of their responsibility for the cause of peace and international security, the socialist countries consistently separate ideological issues from problems of interstate relations in their policy ..."

Because the maintenance of peace is in the present time the cardinal question for the further existence of mankind the responsibility for peace is in our opinion an important as-

pect in the process of the development of a New International Information and Communication Order. Therefore it would be an essential confidence building measure in the international information and communication relations if the western representatives in UNESCO would return back to the consensus that the freedom, duties and responsibilities in the field of information and communication are inseparable from each other as it was enshrined already in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from 16 December 1966. Article 20.1 of the same Covenant ("any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law") demands today concretely from all mass media, whether public of private, to renounce each and all propagation of a Star War as a possible military option, of a nuclear war as possible to lead, to limit and to win as well as to renounce each and all slanderous campaigns against other countries.

We don't want to argue here with those who claim that true press freedom is possible only under capitalist conditions. Let's answer them shortly by the well-known bourgeois journalist Ben H. Bagdikian from the U.S.

Referring to the U.S., he wrote in his book "The Media Monopoly", Beacon Press Boston, 1983:

> "... Today fifty corporations own most of the output of daily newspapers and most of the sales and audience in magazines, broadcasting, books and movies.
> The fifty men and women who head these corporations would fit in a large room. They constitute a new Private Ministry of Information and Culture ...
> In fact, American news, under that doctrine, has become increasingly conservative, not truly neutral, and too often devoid of meaning ..."

A decisive task the mass media face today is providing information to hundreds of millions of people in the world about how peace can be maintained, what chances for their survival exist and what they can do for it.

Besides important peace activities of UNO, UNESCO and other

international organizations, e.g., the Comprehensive Proposals of the USSR for the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the earth until the year 2000 and the other numerous disarmament proposals by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries as well as the Declaration of Dehli and following documents signed by the Heads of States respectively Heads of Governments of India, Mexico, Argentine, Greece, Sweden and Tanzania, relevant documents of the Socialist Internationale and of various peace movements deserve and nee the widest dissemination all over the world.

Of course, it does not serve the process of confidence building if one or the other country wants to dominate and dictate the information, wants to be the world's censor. Take only one example for this.
In a "Report to the Honorable Arlen Specter, The United States Senate" the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) made a critical analysis of information materials issued by the Department of Public Information of the UN (DPI) on the base of "Criteria Provided by the Department of State and Used in GAO Content Analysis of DPI Materials". There one can read on pages 42 ff:

"The Department would consider contrary to U.S. policies and/or interests statements on the following topics which would (and now we quote only a few examples)

- State or infer that the U.S. policy of 'constructive engagement' supports apartheid.
- Criticize the United States for continuing its diplomatical, commercial or cultural ties with South Africa.
- Uncritically endorse a nuclear test ban without noting U.S. reservations.
- Uncritically condemn continued production of binary chemical weapons in the absence of an effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban.
- Characterize the U.S. strategic defence initiative as a militarization of outer space and/or a major obstacle to disarmament progress.
- Conclude that resources freed as a result of arms cuts by

the major powers should be committed in advance for development.

- Fail to adequately recognize Western objections to a World Disarmament Conference.
- Advocate imposing on the media the obligations to undertake specific social tasks.
- Propose to restrict the principle of free flow of information.
- Legitimize the concept of orbital sovereignty for developing countries.
- Promote the utilization of one nation one vote decision-making in the executive organs of international organizations.
- Uncritically endorse Soviet participation in an international conference on the Middle East ..."

One has to not that this is not a matter of giving directives for the performance of American diplomats but these are criteria elaborated for information materials of the United Nations "to ensure that effective action is taken when biased materials are identified (page 38)".

Such "effective action" may come out to be an obstacle for the free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information and would certainly not improve the climate in the field of information and communication.

To finish our contribution to the discussion: Mankind has serious problems of global character to solve, the Nr. 1 of which is the maintenance of world peace. No problem, be it the impoverishment of the Third World, the ecological damage or the exhaustion of traditional raw materials and energy resources can be solved nowadays by one nation or region alone, can't be solved against a nation or region. And most important: none of these problems can be solved anymore by war.
The condition for the further existence of mankind can only

be secured together and in peace.

This needs mutual confidence which only can be built when the international information and communication relations take actively part in this process.

FALKO RAAZ

CULTURE, INFORMATION AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN EUROPE

I.

Today confidence, peace and security between nations and peoples also requires a higher level of information and mutual knowledge. First of all that means cooperation in the field of distribution and reception of peace promoting ideas in a larger scale. Parts of this process can be among other things

- the widening of international relations;
- the building of a worldwide information and communication network;
- the activity of the mass media;
- the tourism;
- the contacts between persons and last not least a
- growing exchange in the field of Culture, Art, Education, Science, Public Health and Sports - that what is called "cultural exchange".

The relation between culture and information or the mass media always has not only one dimension. Firstly the mass media and the carried information form a part of the cultural life of each society. Secondly international exchanged cultural values of a country always are an information about the way of life, the experiences, traditions and perceptions of its inhabitants. (Therefore cultural exchange always is "cultural information" or "information by cultural means", too). Thirdly the states actively use in their cultural relations the media more than ever before (including new systems like satellite and video technology) in order to reach other peoples by cultural information. This is, of course, a consequence of the rapid development and the spreading of the mass media in the developed areas of the world in Europe especially.

By this way new conditions and opportunities for the spreading of cultural information also arose. On the one hand more favourable conditions for better and more expensive infor-

mation about cultural and scientific achievements of other peoples, e.g., by works of art or the purchase of foreign book licences, films, features and TV programmes. On the other hand there are more favourable conditions for international cultural information based on international broadcast, the exchange of publications or the bilateral cooperation between news agencies, radio and TV stations.
But the contrary also is possible: the cultural identity of many nations is endangered by the products of culture industries in the hands of transnational corporations. The patterns of life they carry with them in fact exercise cultural imperialism. The "Report by the international Commission for the study of communication problems - Many voices, One world -" therefore stated: "Because communication is a part of culture as much as an influence upon it, the development of a national communication system can help to foster a thriving national culture". But the Report also underlined that communication "may also be a threat to the quality and values of culture" and that the "indiscriminate opening of doors to new experiences and impressions by the media sometimes alienates peoples from their own culture".[1]

It is evident that the spreading of international communication and a more expansive free flow of information is not a guarantee from the first that cultures can enriche each other. First of all that is true for the necessary spreading of the ideas of peace, cooperation, understanding and friendship between the peoples in order to promote mutual confidence: That means that the question of the content of international distributed information is of special importance. I would like to put up the thesis that East-West cultural exchange can be an important instrument to spread first of all such information which is really serving the cause of confidence building in Europe. This is because of the fact that the topics and the content of these exchanges are agreed on between the parties in a sense of common interest and mutual advantage. (It is e.g. hardly thinkable to include in a feature-film week agreed on in a bilateral

cultural agreement also films which defame the culture of the receiving country and cause mistrust. Or an other example: Discussions between teachers of different countries are organized to reduce irrational enemy pictures by the exchange of curricula or the textbook revision not to build new barriers of mistrust.) Additional opportunities to conduct the exchange in a civilized way and not as a unilateral indoctrination result from the fact that the forms and methods of exchange are also agreed on jointly (exhibitions, seminars, discussions, festivals, exchange of delegations etc.).

II.

In general the ability of cultural exchange to spread confidence building information results from the contact and the acquaintance with the cultural life on other peoples. By this way it is possible to get familiar authentically both with the social reality and the political aims. This allows to reduce stereotypes, prejudices, perversions and distortions of psychological war and to circulate accurate information. In detail cultural information can build confidence because of the following facts:
Firstly it can build the mutual respect and acknowledgement of cultural achievements of other peoples created in peaceful work;
Secondly the information on customs, traditions and preceptions of other peoples and the acquaintance with their "social psychology" can reduce unjust enemy images. (These enemy images as the American journalist P. G. Coy wrote "act as rose-colored glasses for the national eye, overemphasizing information that conforms to the image, and discounting or filtring out data that is not compatible with it". This includes e.g. as he wrote "stories on Soviet art, music, family life and child care, or the role of woman in the Soviet labor force".);
Thirdly cultural information can reduce mistrust and fears produced by wrong perceptions of a military and political

threat ("... We will not trust that which we have not allowed ourselves to know and understand." P. G. Coy);
Fourthly it can stimulate the readiness for understanding and peaceful coexistence;
Fifthly it can replace hostile ideological eagerness by civilized intellectual discussions, defamation by accurate information and lies by the right facts;
Sixthly it can create conditions to discuss the contribution of cultural workers from different countries for dialogue and cooperation to find common interests and organize joint actions.
In this connection it is, of course, to take into consideration, that the different fields of cultural relations represent different opportunities for confidence building. An exhibition of porcelain transmits other information than a conference of scientists like the Pugwash conferences. Nevertheless this is no disadvantage, but on the contrary: Thus one can take into consideration various needs and interests of the people.

There are some additional factors promoting the exchange of cultural information as an element of confidence building:
- the existence of an European network of cultural relations, which stood against all political hindrances in the last 6 - 7 years;
- the existence of joint historical and political traditions uniting European nations;
- since the early 80s cultural workers of all European countries are engaged against the idea of a limited war and for confidence and understanding in a new quality;
- a growing number of moderate western politicians also understands cultural information as an element of confidence building.

The process of confidence building by cultural informations is faced by certain barriers and hindrances showing the limits of cultural relations. There are among others ideological prejudice, anticommunist stereotypes, commercial mechanisms and imbalances in the exchange of books, feature

films, plays, TV news etc.
Furthermore, the desirable exchange of cultural information should not be misused to interfere in internal affairs of other countries, e.g. to build up "dissidents"among artists and scientists. The national identity of each culture should be preserved. That's why I mean that the governments have both a special responsibility and an important opportunity to ensure that cultural relations transmit information favourable for confidence building:

- Governments can conclude long-term agreements and influence with them the political aims of cultural exchange as an instrument of confidence;
- They can predetermine the themes and topics being of special importance for confidence building;
- They can ensure the financial conditions for the exchange and organize a stable basis for cultural relations;
- They can ensure the reciprocity in all desirable cases;
- They can promote the information exchange between the appropriate institutions of a society: universities, academies, schools, TV and radio stations, associations of artists, scientists, journalists and so on.

Altogether governments can ensure calculability, rationality and stability of the mutual exchange of information by cultural relations.

III.

In the international community there are already certain common perceptions on the necessity and the way of realization of confidence building cultural information distributed by the mass media. This consent was reached in the framework of UNESCO and in the CSCE process.
It should be used more than before as a basis for the bilateral and multilateral cooperation. And there is no lack of new ideas as the Budapest cultural forum shows. EUROCULT 1972 in Helsinki already stated "that the audio-visual media, and television especially, make and could increasingly make (the major contribution) to mutual understanding among European nations and to their knowledge of the cultural achieve-

ments of other nations".[3]
It further recommended a "wider international distribution and exchange of cultural programmes of high quality", the production "of a series of cultural programmes which would be broadcast jointly in European countries" and suggested the idea of a "permanent European cultural television programme".[4] MONDIACULT 1982 declared in its "Mexiko City Declaration on cultural policies", that "the modern communication media should facilitate objective information on cultural trends in the various countries, without detriment to the freedom of creativity and cultural identity of nations".[5] Resolution 103 recommended the media "to use the resources of culture and information, on behalf of peace and international understanding, to assist the popularization and dissemination of works strengthening the ideals of peace and humanism".[6] Furthermore, MONDIACULT stressed that "the mass media ... should promote and bring about cultural exchange between peoples so as to enable them to know and understand one another better. It should never be a one-way operation merely imposing on others the culture of those with the greater technical and financial power".[7] Thus one can see that there is a certain consent about

- the necessity to use the mass media for accurate cultural information;
- not to manipulate other cultures in a one-way-direction;
- to use cultural information for peace and understanding and thus for confidence;
- to improve the opportunities of the mass media to distribute cultural information as a peace promoting element.

The Budapest cultural Forum marked a new phase in the international discussion about the relations between culture and the mass media. Some 30 proposals were submitted to this topic. Analysing theses drafts, submitted by capitalist and socialist countries

- several even were joint proposals - one can observe the following directions of cooperation;
- the better and more effective exchange of radio and TV

programmes with a cultural content on a non-commercial basis;
- the better mutual information about cultural events in the media;
- the establishement of European data banks or archives of films, cultural TV programmes, pictures, photos and compositions;
- the co-production of cilms;
- the improvement of the distribution of films, especially on a non-commercial basis;
- media lessons in the schools.

These proposals - some of them are already realised in the bilateral cooperation - can promote the exchange of cultural information via mass media in the eighties and nineties. They are able to ensure that the intellectual exchange, which always is intellectual struggle, too, is led by civilized forms in order to reduce mistrust and to build confidence.

Footnotes

1 Many voices, one world, Paris, London, New York 1980, p. 161 and 159

2 Coy, P. G., Mirrors that reflect false images, Commentary Oct./1984

3 in: the Development of cultural Policies in Europe, Helsinki 1980, p. 277 ff.

4 Ibid.

5 World Conference on Cultural Policies, Mexico 1982, Paris 1982, p. 44

6 Ibid., p. 126

7 Ibid., p. 11 f.

FRANK-MICHAEL BAHR

REMARKS ON NEW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES (NITs) BYPASSING CONTENT-RELATED REGULATORY APPROACHES OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICIES

Following the discussions on what role the information and communication media might play in the process of confidence building, the term 'confidence building' itself deserves a higher degree of clarification in terms of strategies presently employed for the implementation of NITs. It is this set of strategies which determines the scope in which action may be taken, and the extent to which current action may prove successful.

One of these strategies has been understood as a main factor undermining the viability of UNESCO for the re-organization of international communication and information infrastructures:

(a) the strategy of 'technologizing' basically political issues and solutions to problems. International bargaining is increasingly being shifted to the cognitive discourse levels of the standards of communication between computers, the questions of protocols plugs; it is, therefore, moving away from fora like UNESCO where issues were approached in a political discourse. Of course the technologization of discourses does not resolve the political nature of conflicts, but it does stress the role of technical fix exponents and favours the participants in charge of technological capabilities and developments.

(b) Observations indicate that changing the prior context of multilateral agreements and consultations into systems of feudal, vertically structured bilateral relations in the field of NITs has proven successful in supporting the political interests of technologically dominant societies. Opportunities to increase the share of bilateralizing relations in information and communication are directly related to the growth rate of new services and technological progress.

(c) At the same time, the import of non-governmental actors originating in the private-sector economy appears to be growing rapidly in comparison with small and medium sized nations and technologically inferior players.

(d) Directly related to this third observation of currently employed strategies are moves toward close-to-unrestricted de-regulation in almost all relevant information economies. When the United States' Federal Communications Commission issued the Above 890-decision in 1959, allowing for the construction of private telecommunication networks by e.g. railway companies and electric power suppliers, the bypass was raised to serve as a pattern guiding national, and in the long run international communication policies. Unregulated, new services were allowed to substitute regulated services, and political control of technological progress suspended formerly valid principles like the cross-subsidization of services, unity of rates and universality of services. Bypassing as well applies to content related aspects of regulations: American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT & T), restricted to the provision of network infrastructure before its break-up in 1982,[1] may very well enter into the field of content production in the near future. Again, this strategy is all the more relevant as new services and hardware segments supersede and substitute infrastructures for which the political question of content has been discussed internationally during the periods of East-West and North-South dialogues.

(e) Do these four elements give reason to make a distinction between these periods and the structures of current transformations in international information and communication systems ? At least it is reasonable to review the failure of the New International Information and Communication Order (NIICO) debate in the light of these four observations. The observations preclude any successful international regime which asserts that confidence building - be it in the East-West or North-South dimensions - could be reached via the regulation of content. Technologization, bilateralization,

privatization and de-regulation are by their nature the key elements of a period beyond systems marked by East-West and North-South conflict perceptions. Now allicances and shared voting-behaviors are shifting and floating along the lines of these four elements and their iterations. Strengthening confidence between societies and peoples in either of these two dimensions of global conflict implies the necessity of the new elements being realistically taken into account. Both conflicts persist and to a certain degree are bypassed, very much like semi-private Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDNs) bypass Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTNs) in the United States (for example AT & T's Net/1000 providing about 100 ISDN service points for business users in 1985).

The new elements remaining unconsidered, it might not be possible to determine whether confidence-building translates into the integration of USSR long-distance telephone networks into the global infrastructure of American Express Co. or the build-up of parallel, though technically identical, networks on behalf of Socialist countries; does confidence-building translate into the purchase of Landsat-data by the GDR, or a tripod international remote-sensing regime held by India, Canada and France?

Since the free flow debate of the NIICO under the conditions of the implementation of NITs has been turned into the definition of computer plugs and interfaces at least to a certain degree, the question of how to promote 'friendship propaganda' rather than hate propaganda in the international flow of news and views experienced a reduction in import. (Even if the number of transnational TV channels in the West, for example, is boosted to some 30 or 40, the amount of time available for watching TV will still be the same, that is 24 hrs. a day at a maximum.) This is to say that even if confidence-building in the age of direct broadcasting by satellite (DBS) may be provided under market conditions by Radio Luxembourg, the present share of some 5 per cent of all international communication flows occupied by

so-called 'entertainment' communications will still be reduced significantly. While only these communications were open to content-based regimes, NITs promote communications links between societies and economies which turn up as a factor contributing to the result of trade balances rather than cultural exchanges.

It is well known that Canada traditionally regarded its cultural identity and distinctiveness from the United States as a guiding principle for making communications policies domestically as well as internationally. Bill C 58 may serve, at this point, as a prime example for the formerly overwhelming relevance of cultural argumentation and regulation considering content. This bill placed the Canadian magazine Maclean's in a competitive position with regard to Reader's Digest and Time: Maclean's was enabled to appear weekly due to an expansion of its financing via advertizing revenues; this was made possible by a change of the Canadian Income Tax Act which eliminated tax benefits for Canadian advertizing funds if they were expended for United States advertizing media. This chiefly led to disadvantages for a number of small American television stations which mainly served Canadian audiences across the border. Some stations were apparently established for the primary purpose of milking the Canadian market. It had been estimated that Canadians spent some $ 21.5 million on U.S. TV advertizing. As a result of Bill C 58, the revenues of American border broadcasters dropped to nearly $ 6.5 million in 1978. This bill clearly is a product of the liberal Trudeau era, of Third Option policies directed at the diversification of Canada's external relations, of a growth of interest in more equitable relations with the United States, of steps towards the resolution of identity crises stemming from the dominance of East-West perceptions in situations structured differently. To illustrate this point that confidence building encounters different conditions nowadays, it is useful to refer to the findings of the Canadian Nielsen-task force made public in Ottawa in March, 1986.

The recommendations of the Nielsen Report are the exact opposite of the passage of Bill C 58, which aimed at the Third Option: "The study team has been made aware of a potential issue for the cultural industries that may arise in the forthcoming trade negotiations. Private sector cultural organizations in the United States have asserted that Canadian content requirements are the second most serious trade problems facing U.S. cultural industries. Grants and contributions have also been designated as a trade barrier."(2) While such formulations in the Nielsen Report have secured a benevolent attitude on part of the United States even in the area of telecommunications and transborder data flows, Bill C 58 has become one of the, and perhaps the most important sumling block in the U.S.-Canadian relations: Henry Kissinger broached the matter in talks with Foreign Minister Allan MacEachen; the United States Congress passed legislation limiting tax exemptions for costs incurred by U.S. citizens attending Canadian cultural events and thus caused Canada revenue losses amounting to several hundred millions of dollars. Senator Goldwater introduced a legislative initiative designed to prohibit foreign ownership of cable television companies if such ownership was not permitted U.S. citizens in the corresponding foreign countries. This regulation in particular would have had a strong impact on several large Canadian companies which held comprehensive franchise rights in the United States. Both President Carter and President Reagan urged the U.S. Congress to enact such legislation. The initiative which most threatened Canada was the Senate's Mirror Bill (1982) which aimed at cancelling tax exemptions for United States companies investing in Telidon equipment, a Canadian videotex system.

Of course the duration and intensity of the dispute - Bill C 58 was passed in 1975 (!) - stemmed from a significantly more profound rationale than the interests of individual advertizing or TV lobbies: U.S. Senator Moynahan noted in a plea for the amendment that "(...) the Canadian have made the issue a major test of our will to protect U.S. service

industries faced by unreasonable and unfair discrimination by a U.S. trading partner (...). The border broadcast issue is indeed a test of our trade laws."(3)

By presenting the Nielsen Report the Canadian government signalized a significant change in its attitude toward implementing a nationally oriented communications policy and the means for doing so. Its policy now exaggeratedly follows the de-regulation philosophy promulgated by the United States; the Report notes on this point: "Technological change has made regulatory policies and methods in broadcasting and telecommunications obsolete.
Continuing regulation as is will continue to inhibit innovation in each industry and, especially for telecommunications, the economy as a whole. Industry and regulatory developments in U.S. broadcasting and telecommunications will continue to be the most innovative and dynamic in the world and provide the model for the Canadian private sector."(4) While the Report's section on the broadcasting industry makes, above all, quotas ('Canadian content') responsible for a lack of attractiveness and international acceptance of Canadian productions and advises abolishing these Canadian attitueds, in order to allow the forces of the market to operate freely, the Report states the following on the area of telecommunications: "In telecommunications, competition has been rapidly developing in some areas of the industry (both in the U.S. and parts of Canada) for the last several years. This industry is becoming an increasingly vital part of Canada's 'postindustrial' infrastructure. Moving away from regulatory practices developed in the old monopoly environment, coupled with major planned reductions of regulation in competitive areas, is critical if telecommunication industry innovation and productivity is to keep up with our southern neighbour. Compared to the U.S., Canada's regulated long distance rates are too high; this decreases the competitiveness of our service sector and increases the cost of doing business in Canada. Universal household telephone service can be maintained, even with increased competition, through innovative lo-

cal service rate structures such as local measured service. The present regulated rate structure depresses local service rates for all subscribers, whether they need this help or not."(5) The task force recommends abolishing the principle of cross-subsidization in favour of the cost principle in setting rates: both are measures designed to adapt the Canadian telecommunications system to U.S. standards which have stood in contrast to Canadian standards since the split-up of AT & T. Moreover, the subsumption of cultural and social components of this area of action under economic and structural goals is being significantly accelerated by the conservative government of Prime Minister Mulroney within a framework of the preparation of free-trade agreements and G.A.T.T. talks on traded computer services and telecommunications services. Internally, a concept of abolishing all of the characteristics in the Canadian system which might work against a closer interface with the United States, above all the particular role of the state and regulatory practices aimed at the redistribution of infrastructure services, goes hand in hand with the free-trade interest of the Prime Minister.

The confrontation of Bill C 58 and the approach taken by the Nielsen-task force in its recent report does not only discourage former Canadian experiences with making communications policies along the lines of cultural identity and content-related regulation, but it also demonstrates the new environment for international confidence building under conditions of widespread technologization, bilateralization, privatization and de-regulation. Strategies of confidence building, which have been valid during the eras of North-South and East-West conflicts dominating the international system may very well prove pointless in an international information and communication order featuring shifting alliances and the trade balance at the bottom lines of communication policies evaluation.

Notes

(1) Cf. US vs. AT & T, Modification of Final Judgement, District Court for the District of New Jersey, Civil Action No. 17-49, January 8, 1982.

(2) (Nielsen Report) A Study Team Report to the Task Force on Program Review: Economic Growth. Culture and Communications; Ottawa 1986, p. 43.

(3) Op. cit., quoted from John Meisel: Escaping exstinction: cultural defence of an undefended border; Ms. (mimeo) 1985, p. 23.

(4) (Nielsen Report) A Study Team Report to the Task Force on Program Review: Management of Government. Regulatory Programs; Ottawa 1986, p. 179.

(5) Ibid.

KAARLE NORDENSTRENG & TARJA SEPPÄ

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE MASS MEDIA:
The Rediscovery of a Forgotten Story

The Idea and the Birth of the Organization

After World War I it was believed that a new era was to begin in international relations. The horrors of war were fresh in people's minds; there was a need to prevent future wars and to establish conditions for lasting peace. Power politics and secret diplomacy were regarded as major reasons for the outbreak of war. Now the time had come to replace them by international cooperation, collective security and open diplomacy. The League of Nations was established to channel these aspirations; it was the first great exercise of the world in organizing itself for peace.

The Council of the League met for the first time on 16 January 1920, six days after the Treaty of Versailles came into force. The Covenant of the League was part of the Treaty; the formulation of the Covenant was made by a special Committee established by the Paris Peace Conference. The Committee was chaired by the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson. Wilson wanted the drafting of the Covenant and the setting up of the League of Nations to be an integral part of the whole Peace Conference and that it be given priority over other difficult problems.[1] Peace was to be the highest value.

Woodrow Wilson's person became to symbolize the whole idea of the League. However, despite his great personal efforts, he was unable to get the US Senate to ratify the Covenant. The Covenant has been described as "a testament to the aspiration of man to govern his affairs by reason, to assert the concept of justice into the settlement of international disputes and to enshrine the collective interest of all nations a supreme above the interests of any group of nations or of any individual nations".[2]

The preamble of the Covenant reads as follows:

> The High Contracting Parties,
> In order to promote international co-operation and to

achieve international peace and security,
by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,
by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and
by the maintenance of justice and scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another,
Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

One of the leading ideas that the League had was to work in public and to give wide publicity to its activities, marking the dawn of open diplomacy. This can be read from the preamble: "(...) international peace and security (...) could be achieved (...) by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations (...)". The League also relied upon the influence and impact of public opinion in international relations. Woodrow Wilson called the League "the court of public opinion".[3]

It was natural, then, that the League gave quite a new role to the mass media - mostly the press at that time. This open policy of the organization meant that the League worked with the press and in the presence of the press. Whenever possible, the press had the right to be present at the League meetings, whereas on meetings held behind closed doors the League was obliged to furnish the press with all relevant information. This imposed various duties on the League.[4] This kind of relationship between an intergovernmental organization and the press was something completely new. The role of the press was stressed already at the Paris Peace Conference, but no action was taken at that time.[5] It was through the League that the press achieved a new and institutionalized role in international relations, reflected in such developments as the gathering of foreign correspondents at the League.[6] The press was indeed incorporated into the system of international relations in an unprecedented manner - comparable only to the step taken much earlier when the press assumed its central role in bourgeois democracy by operating as an extension of Parliament.

The story of the League of Nations and the mass media provides us with topical material under at least three different chapters:

1. "Collaboration of the Press in the Organisation of Peace" - activities related to the general operative conditions of the press, with landmarks such as international expert conference in Geneva (1927), Copenhagen (1932) and Madrid (1933).

2. "Moral Disarmament" - activities related to the first Disarmament Conference in Geneva (1932-33).

3. "Modern Means of Spreading Information Utilised in the Cause of Peace" - activities related to cinema and broadcasting, including the 1936 landmark Convention on the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace.

The present progress report covers the first two of these chapters. The third topic, which brings us towards the end of the 1930s and at the same time the League of Nations itself, will be reported separately.

Collaboration of the Press in the Organization of Peace

On 16 September 1925 the delegate for Chile, M. Yanez said at the 12th plenary session of the League Assembly:

> We must stimulate among the people that new spirit which the war produced and which the League of Nations is trying to spread throughout the world. (...)
>
> I can conceive no more effective method of forming this new spirit than by influencing the minds of peoples through the Press and moulding the future generations in the schools.
> With regard to the Press, I suggest for your consideration the idea of unifying its directive action on public opinion and its moral influence over Governments. Journalism has in every country but one meaning in its spirit and in its essence, because it is and should be the reflection of the ideas of liberty, progress and morality.
> A universal bond of feeling unites all men and all peoples on the question of peace and the welfare of the working classes. The Press is the vanguard of these ideas, and that is why I submit the following draft resolution to the Assembly. (...)

> I wonder if this idea can be considered as coming within the scope of the action and mission of the League? Can the League call upon the Press of the entire world to collaboration in the work of world fraterny, in that powerful intellectual movement which will be the best guarantee of security, disarmament and arbitration? I believe it can.
> If the League of Nations is not legally entitled to do so, it at least possesses the moral authority to take this step, and I think it should do so.[7]

The initiative was welcomed by a number of delegations - Spain, Uruguay, the British Empire, France, China... Among the interesting details to be found in the debate on the Chilian proposal (in the sixth Committee of the Assembly dealing with political questions) is the intervention of the Hungarian delegate Apponyi. According to the proceedings he

> recalled that at the meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference which took place in Paris in 1900, he had sponsored a similar proposal which had been submitted to that meeting. That attempt had entirely failed, because it had been too ambitious. It had aimed at imposing a certain guidance on all organs of the Press; this was contradictory to the very nature of the Press, the organs of which were jealous of their freedom.
> In appealing to the Press to collaborate in the work of universal conciliation, care must be taken not to repeat this mistake; no attempt should be made to dominate the Press or to make it dependent on any organ of the League of Nations, but it should have access to the sources of information at the disposal of the League. If the Chilian proposal were applied in this sense, it might bear fruit.

The delegate of Belgium, M. Hymans, was entrusted to summarize the results of this debate to the full Assembly on 25 September 1925. He wrote in his report:

> I need not emphasise here the part played by the Press in international life. The newspapers are fundamental to all the judgements which public opinion in each country passes on the other nations of the world. It is for this reason that the Press can exercise a considerable influence in favour of the establishment of better international relations and can contribute more effectively perhaps than any other institutiton to that moral disarmament which is the concomitant condition of material disarmament.
> The Chilian proposal is undoubtedly a bold one. The Press, like all great Powers, is rightly jealous of its independence. We must therefore approach the vast and delicate problem raised by this resolution with

> great circumspection. I wish to make it clear at the outset that the League of Nations does not wish to interfere in the affairs of the Press, and will only interest itself in them if the journalists themselves consider that its assistance would be valuable. (...)
>
> The following is the text of the resolution which I ask you to adopt:
>
> "The Assembly,
>
> "Considering that the Press constitutes the most effective means of guiding public opinion towards that moral disarmament which is a concomitant condition of material disarmament:
>
> "Invites the Council to consider the desirability of conceiving a committee of experts representing the Press of the different continents with a view to determining methods of contributing towards the organisation of peace, especially:
>
> "(a) By ensuring the more rapid and less costly transmission of Press news with a view to reducing risks of international misunderstanding;
>
> "(b) And by discussing all technical problems the settlement of which would be conducive to the tranquillisation of public opinion."

This resolution, a slightly modified version of the original Chilian proposal, was adopted unanimously on the same day. As far as we know, it is the first resolution on the fundamental role of the mass media that was adopted by the League Assembly - indeed the first overall position regarding the mass media that has ever been taken by the international community through its multilateral organization.

It is a remarkable resolution not only because of its historical nature but also because of its political and professional substance. It sets the agenda for a deliberation of technical problems, not only in loose relation to a political context (as is the case e.g. the IPDC of UNESCO), but explicitly subordinated to the overall objective of peace and international understanding. In this respect it can be seen as an early version of the 1978 Mass Media Declaration of UNESCO - a shorter but more outspoken version than was produced by the international community 53 years later. Moreover, the 1925 resolution combines press and disarmament - two topics which today have become to be quite sensitive and even explosive, as shown by the process

of the US and UK withdrawal from UNESCO. It would hardly be possible today to get such a resolution adopted by consensus at the UN or UNESCO.

The resolution was followed up by a round of consultations with various countries and international associations (replies from more than 25 countries by March 1926), a meeting of 16 news agencies in August 1926, a meeting of press bureaux of 17 countries in October 1926, as well as an ad hoc committee drawn from the members of the International Association of Journalists accredited to the League of Nations in January 1927.

On the basis of these preparations the League Council decided at its 44th session in March 1927 to convene a Conference of Press Experts in Geneva on 24-29 August 1927. The Conference, according to its declaration,

> brought together sixty-three experts, twenty assessors, and thirty-five technical advisers, from thirty-eight countries, Members or non-Members of the League, representing not only the different continents of the world but also the different categories within the Press itself, of newspaper proprietors, news-agency representatives, journalists, and directors of official Press bureaux.

The declaration went on to express the appreciation of the Conference i.a. "of the principle laid down by the Council and Assembly of the League that there should be no interference whatsoever with the independence of the Press". At the end of the declaration the Conference

> Adopts the following programme in order that journalists may have every facility in residing, travelling, securing news and improving their professional equipment, and that news itself may be free at the source, expediated in every possible way in its transmission, protected before and after publication against unfair appropriation, and given the widest possible dissemination, to the end that the work of the Press may be made more effective in its responsible mission accurately and conscientiously to inform world public opinion and hence to contribute directly to the preservation of peace and the advancement of civilisation;
> And adopts the following special resolutions, based on technical, professional, and international consi-

> derations, as the first steps towards carrying this programme into effect:

The resolutions cover, mostly in great detail, such more or less technical questions as press rates, coding of press messages, improvement of communications, transport of newspapers, postal subscriptions to newspapers, protection of news, professional facilities of journalists (with 10 subpoints) and censorship in peace-time. But among "Miscellaneous Resolutions" there are also two which deal directly with the politically sensitive content of the mass media:

> Publication or Distribution of Tendentious News
> Cognisant of the fact that the publication or distribution of obviously inaccurate, highly exaggerated, or deliberately distorted news or articles is calculated to cause undesirable misunderstandings among nations and suspicions detrimental to international peace;
> And desiring to promote among people the growth of mutual understanding, necessary to world peace;
> This Conference expresses the desire that the newspapers and news agencies of the world should deem it their duty to take stringent measures to avoid the publication or distribution of such news or articles, and should also consider the possibility of active international cooperation for the attainment of this purpose, which is in conformity with the spirit of the League of Nations.
>
> Moral Disarmament
> The Conference makes a warm appeal to the Press of the world to contribute by every means at its disposal to the consolidation of peace, to combat hatred between nationalities and between classes which are the greatest dangers to peace, and to prepare the way for moral disarmament.

The latter of these was adopted unanimously (as was the case with most of the resolutions), but the former was adopted by 27 votes to 2. Here is an early indication of the controversy around the role of the media in international relations - in particular with respect to the content of communication. However, the dominant feature of this Conference was harmony in the spirit of the League, as is well indicated by the closing words of the President, Lord Burnham:

> Public opinion is, in the long run, the sovereign power in the government of men. As the trustees of

> public opinion, we **Pressmen** have a heavy and constant responsibility to our fellows. All I can hope and pray is that this Conference has deepened and enlarged our consciousness - not a class consciousness, but a general consciousness - of what we owe to mankind, still in the making and re-making, in giving such light and leading as we can to concord and collaboration for the common good.

The results of the Conference were welcomed by the League Council at its subsequent 46th session in September 1927. One of the speakers on that occasion was Sir Austen Chamberlain:

> It is obvious that the large body of resolutions, passed by this important gathering merit, and must receive, the closest attention of the Governments. (...) There is, however, one resolution which has not yet been mentioned, which I read as a promise of co-operation with the Members of this Council and with all men of goodwill in all parts of the world. I refer to the resolution entitled "Moral Disarmament" (...) I am sure that the collaboration of the Press in such a work is of equal consequence, and may be of even greater influence than anything that statesmen can do, and I welcome this assurance and this pledge that the Conference is prepared to devote its energies to this work.

The Council referred the most technical issues to the Organization for Communications and Transit, while other resolutions including those on protection of news and on professional facilities of journalists were followed up by the Council in consultation with different governments. No spectacular achievements seem to have taken place in this area in the course of the following few years.

The next major step was taken in the early 1930's, in the context of the 1932-33 World Disarmament Conference - and a deteriorating international situation. The Conference of Governmental Press Bureaux and Representatives of the Press was convened in Copenhagen in January 1932. The scope of this Conference was less technical than that of the 1927 Geneva Conference and its main resolutions were concerned with the inaccurate news, the rest covering follow-up of the earlier Geneva Conference and cooperation of official press bureaux.[8] The resolutions on inaccurate news include

among others the following:

> The Committee of Heads of Official Press Bureaux believes it its duty to proclaim that the campaign against the dissemination of inaccurate news is one of the necessities of international life, and, as regards the methods of pursuing this campaign, to formulate the following observations:
> One of the most effective means of combating inaccurate information is the rapid spread of accurate and abundant information through the agency of the Press Bureaux. Should accurate news not be forthcoming, there is the risk that the Press may show a tendency to seek its information at other and less well-informed sources and to accept, without verifying it, information which is often inaccurate and sometimes tendentious.
>
> (Committe of Press Representatives),
> Solemnly confirming to the Conference that the international Press, while maintaining its integral right to a fully justified liberty, intends to play its part as distributor of information by propagating only news which, in good faith, it regards as accurate and truthful;
> Considering that the most effective means of combating the dissemination of false or inaccurate news is for the Official Press Bureaux, as far as their information is concerned, to furnish authentic news as quickly as possible.
>
> (Committee of International Organisations of Journalists),
> The Committee considers that the measures that may be taken to avoid the dissemination of inaccurate news should never affect the freedom of the Press, but that this freedom involves the responsibility of journalists as its necessary corollary.
> In this spirit, the Committee notes that the international federative organisations represented at the Conference guarantee the intention of their national sections to enforce the observance of the code of honour of infractions, to exclude the guilty persons from the said associations and to deprive them momentarily of their status as members of these groups.
> The Committee notes the existence of an International Court of Honour, founded by the International Federation of Journalists as a result of the joint initiative of that Federation and the International Association of Journalists accredited to the League of Nations .

The Copenhagen Conference was followed up by the Second Conference of Governmental Press Bureaux and Representatives of the Press, convened in Madrid on 7-11 November 1933.[9]

It was convened on the basis of the hope expressed by the 13th Assembly of the League of Nations that definite proposals might be made with a view to "giving effect to some of the principal suggestions offered by the Press Organisations during the enquiry into the problem of the spread of false information which might threaten to disturb the peace of the world and the good understanding between nations".

The Madrid Conference reviewed the action taken under the earlier Copenhagen resolutions and considered various related problems such as the right to correct false information in the intellectual field, the intellectual role of the press, broadcasting and international relations; the status of press correspondents in foreign countries. According to the Conference Report the discussions "showed that all those who participated remained faithful to the spirit of the resolution adopted by the Copenhagen Conference of 1932". The Madrid conclusions also "noted that certain progress had been made on the lines indicated in the principal resolutions of the Copenhagen Conference". Two main ideas were emphasized as a particular result of the Copenhagen Conference, "namely, freedom of the press, full authentic information communicated as soon as possible to the press". Eleven interesting resolutions followed, with a number of reservations and declarations by individual delegates. Among the unanimously adopted resolutions were the following two, relating to the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (founded in 1926 as the technical secretariat and executive body to the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation of the League of Nations and which can be considered as a predecessor of Unesco):

> The Conference,
> having noted the first and very notable volume published by the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation concerning the "intellectual role of the press", which it hopes will be translated into several languages and be circulated as widely as possible.
> Addresses its warmest congratulations to the Institute on the successful initial results of this en-

quiry.
And trusts that the enquiry will be continued with the same success in order to develop, through the press, a better mutual understanding between the nations;

The Conference,
having noted the results of the enquiry carried out by the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation on broadcasting and international relations.

Considers it desirable that the broadcasting services in the various countries should be maintained in such a way as not to affect the good understanding between nations.
And regards it as particularly necessary, in respect of information services, that the agency, newspaper, or official organisation responsible for such services should always be indicated by the transmitting station.

Another resolution concerned the continuation of these conferences.

The Conference,
gratified by the results already achieved in the meetings at Copenhagen and Madrid,
expresses the desire that such meetings should be periodical and that a Committee, appointed for the purpose for each Conference, should be responsible for preparing the organisation of the new Conference in agreement with the Government of the inviting country and with the cooperation of the Information Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations after previous consultation with the various press groups concerned.

However, this resolution was never put in the practice. The mounting contradictions in the international political atmosphere paralyzed these activities.

Moral Disarmament

From the very beginning questions related to disarmament got a prominent role at the League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson demanded already during the war that disarmament be made an essential part of the coming peace order. The first paragraph of the 8th Article of the Covenant reads:

The Members of the Leage recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

There were many prominent men at the League who thought that the most important questions was to secure the execution of the pledges of Article 8 and that the League would probably not survive unless the arms race could be ended and the level of world armaments reduced.[10]
Also from the beginning, "moral disarmament" was understood as an essential aspect of the general concept of disarmament. Thus, e.g. the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, founded in 1922, set itself the aims "(...) to work for moral disarmament and international reconciliation by developing intellectual co-operation among countries through the world and to assist scientific work and place intellectual life on a higher level by that co-operation."[11]
A notable reservation to this view was expressed by the delegate of the USSR on 16 March 1932: "Moral disarmament was not possible unless it were accompanied or preceded by a renunciation of physical armaments, which would bring about moral disarmament."

The League started to prepare a World Disarmament Conference in 1925 - the year of the first mass media resolution. In December 1925 the Council set up a body, a Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, to prepare a draft treaty on which the Conference would begin its work. The Council had advised the Commission to concentrate on the technical problems of disarmament only. The obvious problem was that disarmament was not and is not a technical issue. This had already been noted at the First Assembly of the League (1920), which pointed to the necessity of considering the whole series of political, social and economic problems.[12]
It was not until 1930 that the Commission produced a Draft Convention for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments. It was intended to provide a framework by means of which the limitation and reduction of armaments might be achieved. It was not an agreed upon document; the disagreements were not just between the countries but within them as well. But this gave the coming Conference freedom to consider any other texts or proposals which might be submitted.[13]

At the last session of the Preparatory Commission on 9 December 1930 the delegation of Poland draw the Commission's attention to the particular aspect of security: the achievement of general moral disarmament. The connection between material and moral disarmament was stressed - a point already made in the press resolution of 1925 - and a "moral détente" was considered necessary both for the relations among nations in general and also for the success of the coming Disarmament Conference in particular. The Polish delegation further pointed out the flagrant contradictions between demands for reduction of armaments or demands for total disarmament and an increasingly violent propaganda of hatred tending to promote disorder and even war - false information about other countries which appear in the press. The demand was that by and with the press world public opinion must be convinced of the absolute necessity of practical results in moral disarmament.[14]

The Swedish government also brought this problem and the question of the press to the attention of the Special Committee for the preparation of a Draft General Convention to improve the Means of Preventing War in a letter, dated on 25 April 1931, where it stressed the function and influence of the press during periods of international crisis: "It is impossible to exaggerate the danger that may arise in such cases from irresponsible press campaigns and the publication in the newspapers of inaccurate or biased reports regarding international relations (...)" and stated further that "(...) in such cases the Council of the League should be able to discuss what steps can be taken to put an end to such propaganda." As a basis for the Special Committee's discussions, the Swedish Government submitted the following proposal which might have been embodied in the Convention to strengthen the Means of Preventing War:

> The High Contracting Parties undertake to give wide publicity, in the cases referred to in Article 2 of the present Convention, to the Council's recommendations for the maintenance of peace and the settlement of the dispute, and to the statements on the

dispute published by the Council.

They further undertake to endeavour, so far as their national laws permit, to suppress all verbal or written propaganda designed to prevent a peaceful settlement of the crisis.[15]

The aim of this proposal was to prevent public opinion from receiving information from one side only.
The Committee considered, however, that it could not be inserted in the Convention in view of the diversity between national press laws and the absence of common legislation.[16]

The Polish Delegation took up on 14 May 1931 the Swedish proposal and submitted to the Committee the following resolution, which was adopted and further submitted to the Assembly:

The Special Committee,
Being aware of the danger which, in the event of an international crisis, may arise from irresponsible Press campaigns and publicity given in the Press to inaccurate and tendentious information;
Recognising that aggressive propaganda against a foreign power may in certain circumstances constitute a veritable threat to the world;
Requests the Assembly to consider the problem and examine the possibilities of finding a solution.[17]

Also the Spanish delegation, at the 12th session of the Assembly, on 10 September 1931, touched the problem of moral disarmament, from the point of view of the press. The proposal of the Spanish delegation was largely based upon the same consideration as those of the Swedish and Polish delegations: the press could have a great influence on the relations between the peoples, and it is in the interests of peace that the press should receive and spread as correct and impartial information as possible.
The Assembly decided to refer the Spanish draft resolution, which also concerned the co-operation of women in the organization of peace, for examination to the Third Committee. After consideration the Third Committe decided to treat these two questions - women and press- separately and submitted the following draft resolution to the Assembly:

The Assembly,
Considering that the organization of peace demands an international spirit freed from all prejudices and misconceptions,
Convinced of the necessity of ensuring that Press information shall be as impartial and complete as possible;
Requests the Council to consider the possibility of studying with the help of the Press, the difficult problem of the spread of information which may threaten to disturb the peace or the good understanding between nations.18

The Assemlby adopted this text, which in its own indirect manner became to signify how the international situation had begun to deteriorate. It was on the basis of this resolution that the Conference of Governmental Press Bureaux and Representatives of the Press was convened in Copenhagen in January 1932.

This landmark resolution - the outcome of Swedish, Polish and Spanish initiatives - was followed by another landmark document: a Polish Memorandum on moral disarmament. Dated 23 September 1931 and addressed to the delegations of the Disarmament Conference, it pointedly emphasized the value and urgency of moral disarmament, and suggested that the question should be examined in its entirety at the Conference. As the memorandum concerned the practical attainment of moral disarmament in its suggested spheres, namely the press, education, boradcasting, theatre, and cinema, it raised the question: "How to counteract movement against peace and assure a moral détente by concerted action of the Governments." The aim of moral disarmament was not merely to disarm men's minds but to transform them with a view to establishing a firm psychological basis for the future development of the international community.

Concerning the role of the Press in the attainment of moral disarmament, the Government of Poland referred to the earlier resolutions on this matter and stated further that the press may exert, during times of crisis but also in daily life, if it so desires, a salutary influence by calming people's minds or it may play a fatal role by causing hatred and mis-

trust. It suggested some remedies in the latter case: punishment for a person who is the author for a report containing false and tendentious information; right of reply; setting up of an international disciplinary tribunal for journalists for combating newspaper excesses; establishing an international information bureau for preventing the false presentation of the international situation.

Moral disarmament had been discussed for a long time in the League, it was not a new thing, but as it is stated in the Polish memorandum: "Moral disarmament will make no headway if we rest content with words. What is needed is action."[19]

The Disarmament Conference started its work in February 1932. The General Commission of the Conference had decided to refer the question of moral disarmament to the Political Commission of the Conference, which in turn decided to set up a Committee to study the question of moral disarmament.

The first task for the Committee on Moral Disarmament was to define the various fields it should explore. For this purpose, it instructed a Sub-Committee to prepare the agenda of its work. Having approved its proposals, the Committee established its agenda as follows:

1. Questions concerning intellectual co-operation and technical means of spreading information, including the problems of education, utilisation of cinematography and broadcasting;
2. Questions concerning the co-operation of the Press;
3. Questions of a legal character.[20]

The Committee appointed Sub-Committees to study each of these questions. Finally, in November 1933, the Committee produced Preliminary Draft text concerning moral disarmament for insertion in the General Convention for the Limitation of Armaments, which was submitted for examination to the General Commission of the Conference. The text consisted of a preamble and four articles.

The preamble of the draft text reads as follows:

> The High Contracting Parties,
> Considering that moral disarmament is one of the essential aspects of the general work for disarmament;

Considering that the reduction and limitation of armaments depend to a large extent upon the increase of mutual confidence between nations;
Considering that as far as public opinion is concerned a sustained and systematic effort to ease tension may contribute to the progressive realisation of material disarmament;
Considering that the inter-dependence of States calls not only for their co-operation in the political sphere, but also for an effort of mutual understanding between the peoples themselves;
Being resolved to do whatever lies in its power to induce the nationals to display in any public discussion a spirit of tolerance and mutual respect;
Being convinced that the success of the measures adopted in one country to ensure moral disarmament is largely dependent on the application of similar measures in other countries;
Recognising that the League of Nations has placed at the disposal of the various states the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation, which is particularly suited to the accomplishment of certain tasks connected with moral disarmament, although a different procedure may have to be adopted to meet special situations.

The four articles deal with questions which made up item 1 of the Committee's agenda: questions concerning education, broadcasting, cinematography and co-operation of the intellectual world - that is only one aspect of the problem of moral disarmament. It was stated that when the Committee comes to deal with items 2 and 3 - press questions and legal ones - articles related to these questions can always be added to the existing text.[21]

The Press Sub-Committee met in June 1932. The Polish delegation submitted on 28 June 1932 a draft resolution concerning the assistance which the Press might afford to the work of moral disarmament. In the draft resolution the part played by the Press in the development of international relations was recognized, and it was proposed that an international conference of qualified representatives of the Press for the purpose of considering the problem of moral disarmament, so far as the Press is concerned therewith, should be convened.

The Sub-Committee adopted the Polish draft resolution as a basis of discussion and wanted to hear the representatives

of international journalists on this matter. After this exchange of views, the Sub-Committee proceeded to prepare a preliminary statement which as soon as ready would be submitted to the Committee on Moral Disarmament.[22]

However, in December 1933 the Committee was still expecting to consider the question of the co-operation of the Press in the work of moral disarmament. It seems that this consideration was never properly carried out, although the necessary data had been collected.

In different statements and resolutions the role of the Press was given great importance in the work for moral disarmament and this especially in relation to public opinion; the Press was seen not only as the embodiment, but at the same time a great motive power of public opinion.[23]

Towards the end of the Disarmament Conference the international situation was deteriorating all the time, and what happened outside the League had severe influence on the fate of the Conference. Philip Noel-Baker, the British statesman and Nobel Price winner who at the time was Personal Assistant to the President of the Disarmament Conference and later wrote a book about the Conference and on the reasons why it failed, has stated that the chances of success for the Conference would have been much greater if the time for it had been earlier, in 1931 or even 1930.[24] This same assessment is confirmed at the symposium "The League of Nations in retrospect", held in 1980 in Geneva.[25]

In many countries there were people who thought the League and disarmament were utopian nonsense since "whatever you do, war will come". Such an attitude was to be found in certain circles both within and outside governments. It was deliberately mobilized by anti-disarmament lobbies. For example, in Britain some private manufacturers of arms were eager to support and re-arm Hitler, and this support of the military-industrial complex had also the effect of creating the illusion of public support for the militarist Ministers in the Government.

The same happened in France: since before the First World

War, the most important French newspaper, Le Temps, was under the control of the Comité des Forges - the Private Arms Manufacturers of France. In 1930 the Comité bought control of Les Debats, one of the most important organs of political opinion in France. The Comité acquired control of most of the other newspapers and journals of Paris, too. According to Noel-Baker, through these organs of the Press, the Comité conducted a merciless campaign against the League and its Disarmament Conference in France.[26]

In Germany, the Hugenbrug Konzern bought more than half of all the daily newspapers; it bought all the Press Advertising Agencies; it bought Die Woche and the other leading weekly and monthly periodicals; it bought the German Film Enterprise, UFA and the new Radio Broadcasting Service. This all was used against the Treaty of Versailles, against the League, against disarmament. And it worked. As Noel-Baker has stated, in this struggle the internationalists have won all the arguments, but the bureaucrats and militarists have won all the material victories that count.[27]

References

1. Claude, Inis L. Jr., Swords into Plowshares. New York. 1971, pp. 42-43; Scott, George, The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations. New York 1973, pp. 14-15.

2. Scott, op. cit., p.15.

3. Claude, op. cit., p. 52; see also Walters, F.P., The League of Nations, pp. 38-39 in Luard, Evan (ed.), The Evolution of International Organizations, 2nd ed. New York 1967.

4. The League of Nations and the Press. International Press Exhibition. Cologne, May to October 1928. Information Section. League of Nations. Geneva 1928, p. 7.

5. United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information. The Freedom of the Press. Some historical notes. E/CONF. 6/4, pp. 7-9.

6. Douglas, Paul F. & Bömer, Karl, The Press as a Factor

in International Relations, in National and World Planning. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 162, July 1932, pp. 241-272.

7. League of Nations document C.611.M.196 (1925). All the following quotations are from original Leage documents (without however indicating references in each case).

8. Doc. C.96.1932, see League of Nations Official Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (Part II), March 1932, Minutes of the 66th Session of the Council, pp. 502, 789-797.

9. Second Conference of Governmental Press Bureaux and Representatives of the Press, Madrid 1933, see League of Nations Official Journal, Vol. XV, No. 2 (Part II).

10. Noel-Baker, Philip, The First World Disarmament Conference 1932-33. And Why it Failed? London 1979, p. 54.

11. The League of Nations and Intellectual Co-operation. Revised ed. Information Section. Geneva 1927, p. 43.

12. Scott, op.cit., pp. 189-190; Journal of the League of Nations, No. 2, 3 February 1932, pp. 10-11.

13. Ibid., p. 12; see also Scott, op. cit., p. 257.

14. Doc. C.4.M.4.1931.IX, pp. 415-416.

15. C.268.M.123.1931.VII./C. P. G. 2.

16. League of Nations Official Journal. Vol. XII, No. 7, July 1931. Minutes of the 63rd Session of the Council, p. 1457.

17. C.P.G./Comité de Réd./ P.V.2.

18. Resolution A.48. 1931, see League of Nations. Official Journal. Special Supplement, No 93, Records of the 12th Ordinary Section of the Assembly. Plenary Meeting. Text of Debates. Geneva 1931; see also doc. Conf. D/CDM/3 March 15th, 1932.

19. Doc. C.602.14.240.1931.IX. Memorandum from the Polish Government concerning the attainment of moral disarmament. See also Journal, No. 38, 16th March 1932, pp. 293-295.

20. See Journal, Ibid., pp. 295; Journal (...) No 39, 17 March, 1932, p. 304, Journal, No 55, April 26 1932, pp. 441-42; Conf. D/CDM/24. See also Conf. D/CDM/9.

21. Conf. D/CDM/36, 20 November 1933. See also Conf. D/CDM/37,1 December 1933.; Conf. D/CDM/19. For the whole process, see Conf. D/CDM/15-39.

22. See Journal, No 98, 30 June 1932, pp. 790-792; Conf. D/CDM/2. 28 June, 1932; Conf. D/CDM./24.

23. See in this respect e.g. Journal (...) No. 98, 30 June 1932, op. cit.

24. Noel-Baker, op. cit., p. 59.

25. It was stated that " (...) the Disarmament Conference came far too late (...)" and that (...) the collapse of the Disarmament Conference cannot be imputed to the League of Nations is perfectly just." Steiner, Zara, Introductory essay, pp. 4-5 and Vaisse, Maurice, La Société des Nations et le désarmement, pp. 245-265 in The League of Nations in retrospect. Proceedings of the Symposium. Berlin 1983.

26. Ibid., pp. 60-63.

27. Ibid., pp. 63-64; 4.

HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE

THE PROHIBITION OF WAR AND RACIAL PROPAGANDA UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

There is a very developed system of legal relations between the States in Europe. One can find a lot of international treaties which contain many rules for the behaviour of the States. These rules are legally binding from the position of international law. In addition to the legal norms there are also many political declarations with a great importance for the development of the co-operation between the States. Of a special importance is the **Final** Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975, because of that fact that it has a special part on the co-operation in the field of information.

Aims of an all-european co-operation in the field of information are therefore:

- an ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in the participating States,
- to contribute to the growth of confidence between peoples,
- to develop mutual understanding between the States and further improve their relations,
- an improvement of dissemination of information,
- to emphasizing the importance of press, radio, TV, cinema, news agencies and journalists.

In this sense one has to use the formula of an European co-operation in the field of information. This is the idea behind the "freer dissemination of information" in the Final Act: "The participating States make it their aim to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries, and to improve the conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State."[1]

It is clear from this part of the Final Act: the aim of the co-operation in the field of information is the improvement of the relations between the States. Information is a part

4

PG

100 mm

A5

1.0

1.1

1.25

1.4

1.6

2.8

2.5

3.2

2.2

3.6

2.0

4.0

1.8

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
1234567890

1.0 mm

1.5 mm

2.0 mm

of confidence building between States. This means on the other hand, that there is a need for rules for the dissemination of information within States and between States. One can find these rules with different characters: moral, political and legal rules.

Legal rules are the most effective rule because they create binding rights and duties. Therefore there is a trend in the international relations to codificate rules for an international exchange of information and communication. There is a framework of legally binding rules for the activities of mass media in Europe today. These rules are the basic principles of international law which are also a part of the Final Act (the principles guiding relations between participating States). Of a special importance for the activities of mass media are the following principles:

1. Sovereign equality and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty,
2. Territorial integrity of States,
3. Non-intervention in internal affairs,
4. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief,
5. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and
6. Co-operation among States.

Especially these principles are the general background for the activities of all mass media which are state-owned or private-owned. The State is responsible for the respect of these rules. Therefore the State has to transform international rules into obligations under domestic law.

A very good example for the relationship between international and internal law of the States is the prohibition of war and hate propaganda. There is no doubt that international law knows a rule of prohibition of these propagandas.[2] But more interesting is the fact that there is also an obligation for the States to promote the ideas of peace, understanding and friendship between the peoples and ethnical groups. This promotion of peace and friendship has to be

undertaken in schools, in the mass media and in public. To transform this international rule into domestic law is more complicated than the prohibition of war and hate propaganda, because it's easier to identify war propaganda than to do something in favour of better understanding between peoples. The next problem is that educational contents, on principle, are an internal affair of the State. The State determines itself which curricula are valid in the public schools. But this does not mean that the States would not have to take into account any obligations resulting from international law when the curricula are set up. On the contrary, more and more international documents asking for certain educational initiatives from the states. More and more documents deal with the obligations of mass media. From the legal point of view most of the documents are resolutions of the U.N. and of UNESCO and carrying therefore the character of recommendations and being obligatory in the political and moral sense. Legally binding documents about educations contents and contents of mass media, however, are very rare and should attract attention from international lawyers.
One can find the clearest obligation in connection with the prohibition of racism and racial discrimination in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1966.[3] As far as education and mass media are concerned, there are two interesting aspects: firstly, article 4 prohibits <u>any</u> racist propaganda by the State or by persons or organizations;
secondly, this prohibition is supplemented by the obligations under article 7: "State Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical groups, as well as to propagating the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Eli-

mination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and this Convention."

These obligations are in fact quite far reaching. Especially the immediate and effective measures in connection with education and mass media are important. Therefore the States have to make efforts and to check the success of the measures. It cannot refer to the possibly private character of certain educational institutions or the mass media. Moreover, it has not only to take measures against racial discrimination as such but also to take a stand against prejudice in the foreground of discrimination. This activity has to make a contribution to understanding among the peoples. In face of the comprehensive character of both articles it is not surprising that they are a main point in the implementation of the convention. Especially the position of the western States is very interesting in this connection. During the elaboration of the Convention article 4 was at the centre of criticism by the western countries. Nevertheless, there was a differentiation among these countries after the convention coming into force. 21 of 26 of the western countries joined the convention. 14 of those accepted the obligations resulting from the convention without any reservations. For the other 7 States this article is fully valid, too, but when ratifying it, they made a declaration of interpretation, according to which they could fulfil it only insofar as it would be compatible with guaranteeing the right to freedom of opinion. Though the juridical sense of this declaration is doubtful - as the expression of race hatred is not a component of the freedom of opinion - it points out, nevertheless, some resistance on the part of some capitalist States.

Taking this into account, one is surprised by the western attitude towards article 7. Obviously, its consequences were underestimated by the western countries at the beginning. Only after the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which is responsible for the implementation of the convention, made the implementation of article 7

a permanent item of discussion during its sessions and asked UNESCO for support one can find the first comments in the reports of western countries on the implementation of this obligation. But the results have not been satisfactory in general. Therefore this item will certainly be a main point in CERD activities for a long time to come:
"The universal character of the principles contained in article 7 of the Convention must be stressed from the outset ... It follows therefore that the guidelines set forth in article 7, which ... are a pre-condition for the implementation of the Convention as a whole, are universally binding."[4]
The example of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination shows that it is possible to codify international legally binding rules for the behaviour of schools and educational institutions in general and for mass media. These obligations are far-reaching and can support the peaceful co-existence between peoples and races. This must be the most important task of mass media in general. Therefore the example of this convention is very important for the international cooperation between mass media and in the field of information and communication in Europe. On the basis of the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE there should be a codification of more exact rules of behaviour of mass media in support of the ideas of friendship and co-operation between peoples. That it is possible to create such rules shows the convention against racial discrimination.

Footnotes

1 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, 1 August 1975, Helsinki. In: New Times, Moscow, 32/1975, p. 41

2 See E. Menzel/K. Ipsen, Völkerrecht, München 1979, p. 452

3 In: Human Rights, A Compilation of International Instru-

ments, United Nations, New York 1978, p. 24

4 UN-doc. A/CONF. 119/11, para. 4

EMIL KONSTANTINOV

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION OF THE DIRECT TELEVISION BROADCASTINGS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE

The deference to the international rights of the states is a factor of considerable significance for the establishment and maintaining of confidence in their interrelations. This fully applies to the international legal co-operation in the carrying out of the direct TV broadcastings via satellite, which can be received directly by the individual TV sets at home.

This new type of TV broadcastings can become an important factor for the cognition and friendship among people, for the broadening of the cultural co-operation among states - both bilateral as well as multilateral. When the international co-operation among states in the information field is carried out in conformity with international law, it can contribute considerably for the establishing and stabilization of the political confidence among them.

At the same time, the direct TV broadcastings can prove to be a factor destroying the confidence among states. They can be directed towards the territory of a foreign state, which regards them as objectionable. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that in contrast to the other forms of international exchange of mass information, as for instance the radio and the printed publications, the direct TV broadcastings are practically beyond the control of the receiving state. Besides, the television images have a strong effect, which is not limited by language barriers.

As a result of this, it is not surprising that the programmes emitted through direct television broadcastings, might lead to undesirable economic, political, social and ideological consequences within the receiving state, if it objects to them. This refers especially to the cases when the content of the broadcastings is contradictory to the social, and political principles and the cultural traditions of the recepient state, with its legal order, or when it is

the bearer of dishonest commercial advertisement and practice. There exists a potential peril that the uncontrolled transmission of direct TV broadcastings can be used as a dangerous ideological weapon against foreign states, especially when the latter are in a state of crisis or are excluded from the information sources.

The danger of using the direct TV broadcastings as a means of destroying the confidence among states is enhanced by the circumstance that there exists discord between the countries, including those in Europe, regarding their international legal regulation. Disputes are carried on concerning the core of the problem - the necessity of obtaining the preliminary consent of the receiving state, when the broadcastings are intended for foreign territory.

Two diametrically opposite concepts collide in a theoretical and practical plan.

According to the one, supported by some developed Western States, the issues of international mass information pertain to the field of international legal protection of human rights, where the principle of free dissemination of ideas across state frontiers has been established. This concept opposes the right to free exchange of information, the sovereign right of each state to control the flow of information on its own territory. It is considered that the individual's right to independent access to all sources of information, and the right to express his opinion freely, according to Para. 2, Art. 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of 1966, likewise the principle of the free use of outer space, as well as the lack of specific international legal regulation of the direct television broadcastings, opens a legal opportunity for the latter's carrying out on foreign territory, without having obtained the preliminary consent of the receiving state.

The other concept treats the dissemination of information via direct TV broadcastings as an issue pertaining to the sovereign competency of the state, whose population receives the respective TV programs. It is considered that

the lack of a specific international legal regulation for the direct TV broadcastings and the standstill of the international negotiations on this issue, is no reason for their transmission on foreign territory without the preliminary consent of the transgressed state. The direct TV broadcastings are not carried out in a legal vacuum. They are part of the international exchange of information, which is controlled by the states through whose territory it flows. This norm results from international law, Art. 19, Para. 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Such a viewpoint also corresponds to the national practice of the states, since in all states, the creation and exploitation of the mass media is not at all an absolutely free activity, but is restricted by national laws.

The present stand of the states on this issue is best reflected in the adopted on Dec. 10th, 1982, Resolution 37/92 of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization concerning the "Principles Governing the Use by the States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting". It was adopted by 107 votes for, to 13 votes against, and 13 abstained. It put an end to the continuing almost 10 years debates on the proposal of the Soviet Union put forward in 1972, concerning the conclusion of an international convention governing the principles of the direct television satellite broadcastings. The resolution is in compliance with contemporary international law. Therein are laid down two basic principles:

1. The state bears responsibility for the direct television broadcastings carried on by it or by individuals under its jurisdiction;
2. The direct television broadcastings on foreign territory are to be carried out only with the preliminary consent of the transgressed state.

Since the technological development of the European states offers an opportunity for a wide-range transmission of direct television broadcastings, as well as their receiving, to be realized in the near future, bearing in mind the per-

spectives for successful international co-operation and maintaining of confidence among them, their attitude towards this Resolution acquires special interest.

In the group of states that are for the free transmission of the direct television broadcastings, are represented Western States, having the practical ability of carrying them out. The firmest and most uncompromising is the stand of the USA, FRG and Great Britain. Only Turkey, of the member-states of NATO voted "for" this Resolution.

The Socialist States support the Resolution. A number of Western States have a flexible attitude towards it. This is a basis for the seeking and reaching of solutions regarding the controversial legal issues of the direct television broadcastings, and a factor for the maintaining of confidence among the states. France deserves special notice in this group. On principle, it accepts the formula of preliminary agreement but reckons that the formulating of the state's responsibility is rather broad and engaging for the state. Portugal abstains, with regard to the stand adopted by Portugese speaking Brazil. Sweden, Finland, Ireland also abstained. Canada actively supported the thesis of preliminary consent during the negotiations, to the purpose of achieving a mutually acceptable compromise.

Positive is the fact that in such an important European region as the Balkans, comprising states members of NATO, member-states of the Warsaw Pact, and Non-aligned States, has been created an atmosphere, favouring the solution of the international problems of the direct television broadcastings in the interest of the peaceful and mutually beneficial co-operation and the growth of confidence among the Balkan States. Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania hold identical stands and support Resolution 37/92. Turkey also supports the stand of preliminary consent. The same refers to a considerable degree to Greece, which abstained from voting against Resolution 37/92. In this way, on the Balkans is formed a region, where favourable conditions exist for the carrying out of direct television broadcastings in ac-

cordance with the principles of international law and the deference to state sovereignty.

The existence of different viewpoints on the issue of the international legal regulation of the direct television broadcastings brings forth the necessity of analyzing the states' arguments, so as to determine how far they comply with international law. Only that comportment of the states, which is in conformity with the international legal norms, can contribute to the stabilizing of the confidence between them.

In this respect the adopting of Resolution 37/92 by the General Assembly of the UNO with overwhelming majority, is a fact of considerable legal and political relevance. Its importance is further increased by the circumstance that in the near future there are no prospects for the adopting of a universal international convention regulating the direct television broadcastings. The Resolution expresses the legal stand of the majority of states in the world concerning the necessity of preliminary consent concerning their carrying out. Although the Resolution, as a recommendation of the General Assembly, has no legal power, it exerts considerable moral-political support on this viewpoint. It reinforces the stand of those states, which, on the basis of international law and their national jurisdiction take the legal and other measures against the unwanted foreign direct television broadcastings. Besides, these states will negotiate on the eventual conclusion of a convention on the direct television broadcastings, based on this Resolution, from considerably stronger legal-political positions. This authoritative document of the General Assembly of the UNO undoubtedly exerts such influence on the leading of the continuing debates around the so-called "New World Information Order", held within the framework of the UNO, UNESCO and the General European Conference on Security and Co-operation".

The contemporary international law is a favourable basis for the successful development of international co-operation in the field of exchange of information, including the

direct television broadcastings, consolidating the confidence among states. That is so, because the deference to the international legal regulations in the exchange of information ensures the respect for such principle rights of the states as sovereignty and non-intervention in their internal affairs.

The stand of the states, supporting the thesis of "free exchange of information and ideas", bases its arguments foremost on its domestic jurisdiction, on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Political and Civil Human Rights, the Declaration of UNESCO on the Means of Mass Media, as well as the Final Act from Helsinki.

However, it should be underlined that international law does not allow the free flow of information through the states' frontiers. According to the principle of sovereign equality of states, laid down in Art. 2 Para.1 of the UN Charter, the states have the full right to control the flow of information through their frontiers, independently of the means carrying it. Therefore, no state is obliged, unless such obligations proceed from special international treaties, to permit the free flow of foreign information on its territory, including the direct television broadcastings. According to international law, no state or international agency has the right to prescribe to other states how to organize their inner life, including the sphere of information exchange.

The exchange of information formulated in Art.19 Para.2 of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, is also placed within the power of state sovereignty and is carried out according to national jurisdiction. Art.19, Para.2 states that everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers. This can be done either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art or through any other media or choice. But it must be borne in mind that the exercise of the rights provided for in Art. 19, Para.2

is subject to certain necessary legal restrictions, provided in Para.3 of the same Article. Art. 3 states that the exercise of the rights provided in Para. 2 of the present Article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Therefore, the state is given the right, if necessary, to enforce by law some restrictions for the respect of the rights and reputation of others or for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals of the people. These rights of the states are rather broad and enable them to control the international exchange of information, flowing through their territory. In this connection it seems inconsistent to speak of absolute freedom of information exchange. What is more, Art. 20 of the same Covenant sets imperative limitations to these freedoms: It provides that any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law, and that likewise, any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. There exist a number of other specific international conventions in the same vein, delimiting the content of the exchanged international information, obliging the states, by international legal means, to be deferential to these restrictions.

The international legal regulation of the content of the information acquires still greater significance for the establishing and maintaining of confidence among states. This is also imperative due to the attempts of some states to legalize the thesis of free exchange of information. International law prohibits even now, as was stated above, the dissemination of information of certain content. This constitutes the propagating of war, apartheid, aggression, genocide - actions defined as international crimes. Any state which encourages such propaganda or does not take measures to prevent it and punish its inciters, carries international legal responsibility.

For the maintaining of confidence among states it is necessary to limit to maximum the possibility for misuse of the

internationally circulated information, by regulating its content more and more. In this respect efforts can be made by the international organizations (UNO, UNESCO) on a bilateral, regional or universal basis, in the professional organizations (for instance that of journalists), in the co-operation among the institutions and the mass media. The rules worked out concerning the content of the exchanged information, should guarantee that it conforms with the spirit and the regulations of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the other international legal norms.
The international co-operation, relating to the free dissemination of information, must necessarily be carried out on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with the aims of the organization, namely to develop the friendly relations among nations, based on the deference to the principle of equality and self-determination of the peoples and that other appropriate measures for the consolidation of world peace be adopted.
This concept was laid down in the Final Act of Helsinki. Therein, the states make it their aim to facilitate the freer and broader dissemination of all forms of information, courage co-operation in the field of information, and the exchange of information with other states. At the same time they express the conviction that this co-operation should be carried out in full conformity with the principles governing the relations between the participating states, as they are laid down in the Declaration on the Principles of the Final Act of Helsinki, by which the states will be guided in their interrelations. Among these is the principle of sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent to sovereignty, as well as the non-intervention in its internal affairs. The deference to the principle of sovereignty is a political and legal guarantee for the successful outcome of the future development of the international information co-operation in Europe and the world, for the exchange of cadres and ideas, for the consolidation of confidence among the states.

Some Western States raise the issue that the states having "free" mass media bore too great a risk and could be held responsible without being guilty themselves. Due to this they do not agree to accept the formulation of Resolution 37/92 of the General Assembly of the UNO concerning the states' responsibility for the actions of the institutions for direct television broadcastings, existing under its jurisdiction. As it was stated above, the freedom of the mass media is not absolute neither in domestic law nor in international law. Moreover, according to international law, the state will be held responsible for its own wrongful acts, and not for the activities of the private information institutions and the journalists, when they are contrary to the obligations assumed by the state. The state will be held responsible, only if it does not take measures to prevent the prohibited by international law direct television broadcastings on foreign territory, as well as, if it does not punish those guilty for the perpetrated legal violation. The assuming of such obligations relating to responsibility, is absolutely possible for the Western States as well. This becomes evident from the adoption, by most of them, of Resolution 37/92. Moreover, according to space law, in the other fields of outer space activity the state is responsible for the activity of the persons under its jurisdiction. Therefore, with regard to the direct television broadcastings will be applied an international legal regime which has already been implemented in other spheres of outer space activity, including those of commercial nature.

OIVA MIETTINEN

WORKING CONDITIONS OF JOURNALISTS

"I would say the greatest thing the CSCE has done for the working conditions of journalists is that today we more or less know what to expect of the job. The whole business has somehow become more systematic."

This is how an experienced and travelled Finnish journalist defines what he feels have been the main achievements of those recommendations entered in the Helsinki and Madrid CSCE documents that were intended to improve the status and working conditions of journalists.

The section concerning information in the third basket is concluded by an extensive list of proposed measures for the betterment of journalists' working conditions.[1] These recommendations are beyond doubt the most concrete ever included in any multilateral international agreement.

In Helsinki it was agreed that the participating States will try to handle in a positive spirit and without unnecessary delay visa applications of journalists; to grant multiple entry and exit visas to correspondents; to facilitate granting of residence permits and obtaining of necessary and relevant documents; to facilitate on a bilateral basis travelling in countries of residence; and gradually to give more freedom of travel outside high-security areas. Response to travel applications should be as prompt as possible, journalists should be allowed to contact their sources of information personally, they should be able to carry their technical appliances without restriction, and they should be able to transmit the results of their work in full and without delay.

The participating States also confirmed that the proper exercise of the journalist's profession may not be used as grounds for deportation or punishment. In the event that an accredited journalist is deported, he will be made aware of the reasons behind the measure and will have the right to appeal for a new handling of his case.

Basket Three and in particular its chapter on information were entered in the Final Act because of Western insistence. It is clear then that questions as to whether or not the recommendations have been fully implemented since Helsinki have concentrated on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. The starting-point was as such rather unfair in that before Helsinki Soviet and East European journalists posted in Western Europe often faced similar restrictions as Western journalists did in the Soviet Union. This, as it was argued in the West, was simply a response to the restrictions imposed in the Soviet Union, such as closing large areas from foreigners.

Removal of Restrictions

Soon after Helsinki determined efforts were started to remove some of the worst bureaucratic obstacles and restrictions; it was clear that governments had taken their commitments seriously. As a result, at the end of 1975 the Soviet Union followed by the other socialist countries began granting annual multiple entry visas to foreign correspondents on a bilateral basis.[2]

Likewise, Western countries began to grant multiple entry visas to correspondents in their area. With the exception of the US and Canada, this mainly concerned correspondents from Eastern Europe, because most countries in the West did not have bilateral visa obligations. Also, some East European countries had bilateral agreements with West European countries such as Finland, Sweden and Austria according to which no visas were required. For example, travel from Finland to Poland and vice versa was free up until 1981 when Poland declared a state of war in the country.[3]

In March 1976 foreign correspondents in the Soviet Union were allowed to travel without preliminary notice 70 kilometres outside Moscow instead of the previous 40 km, a right that diplomats had already been given a few years earlier. This was above all a psychological extension of rights.

However, at the same time a more practical decision was made as well; journalists were given freedom to travel in the Soviet Union without having to present their inland passes to the Passport Office of the Ministry of the Interior for place and time stamps.

In 1976 the German Democratic Republic announced that accredited Western journalists in Berlin were not required to contact the Foreign Ministry Press Bureau prior to meeting representatives of different ministries. On the other hand, the Ministry of the Interior passed a statute in 1973 and a law in 1979 which limit the right of citizens to contact foreigners directly.

Mitigations and responses to mitigations soon came to a limit, however. For example, Western correspondents in Vienna, Belgrade, Bonn, and Berlin still complained that they were not granted multiple visas to countries they had to visit regularly. This matter had not been agreed upon in Helsinki, but it is explicitly mentioned in the recommendations of the 1983 follow-up meeting in Madrid.

Meanwhile in 1975, Hungary had already made a so-called dual accreditation agreement with Austria, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Norway. According to this agreement, a journalist based abroad could obtain a valid and automatically renewable 12-month multiple entry visa as well as other rights of a journalist living in Budapest. A similar agreement was also made with the United States, but the visa is only valid for 3 months.

It is worth mentioning that Finnish journalists do not need a visa to travel to Hungary.

The report of the US Congress Committee on CSCE (1980) claims that since 1977 the Soviet Union had been reluctant to grant permanent accreditations to Western correspondents.[4] According to the report the visa handling procedure in the country had been slow and applications had been rejected.

Steady progress has not been made in making bilateral agree-

ments, either. Holland, for example, rejected a proposal made by the Soviet Union which would have meant greater freedom of travel for journalists in both countries. In Holland, Soviet journalists have to report to the Foreign Ministry in the Hague 24 hours prior to visiting places outside the County of Southern Holland.[5]

Generally speaking, however, the West responded conscientiously to any steps taken by the Soviet Union or other socialist countries. Therefore, the position of Soviet journalists in the United States is more or less as awkward as that of Western journalists in the Soviet Union. Restrictions are slightly less severe in Great Britain and France. On the other hand the Federal Republic has refused to take any discriminatory measures against Soviet journalists, with the exception of travel in high-security areas. Nevertheless, Soviet reporters have said that the handling of their visa applications usually takes too long, and that they repeatedly run into "political and ideological" obstacles.

In the United States, Soviet journalists are not allowed to travel more than 25 miles (some 40 km) from their base without a special permit. For example, a correspondent based in Washington has to report his travel plans, the registration number of his vehicle, etc. 48 hours before leaving for New York. If the Foreign Office does not specifically forbid the journey, the correspondent may go ahead with his plans.

In addition, there are about one hundred cities and districts in the US which are closed to the Soviets: e.g. Atlanta, Detroit and Dallas. However, correspondents may apply for a special permit to travel to these places from the Foreign Ministry. Last year a TASS correspondent was allowed to follow the Republican Party Congress in Dallas. At the end of 1983, the Foreign Ministry partly revised the list of closed cities, but the total number still remained the same. On a few occasions travel applications by Soviet reporters have been turned down; for example, in 1980 a TASS reporter was not allowed to travel to Los Angeles, and later his appli-

cation for a trip to Colorado Springs was also turned down.

Correspondents from other East European countries are free from these and similar restrictions in the US, although they may have to wait considerably for their accreditation to the Foreign Ministry and especially to the White House. For example, a correspondent of the Polish news agency PAP had to wait for more than 12 months for his pass to the White House and only received it "after intervention". It may also take over 6 months to get a visa to the US.
Journalists from non-socialist countries have also had difficulties getting visas if they, or someone in their close family, are members of a Communist Party.

Soviet journalists posted in Great Britain are required to notify of their travel route in the same way as in the United States, but there are no permanently closed districts. According to a Soviet journalist who has been working in London for 5 years, travelling correspondents are under special control: civil servants from the Foreign Office may question correspondents when they are catching a train or registering at a hotel. If a correspondent stays at another hotel than that indicated in his plan, he will be required to give a full explanation.

Correspondents from the Warsaw Pact countries are also under special restrictions in France, especially outside Paris. And at least once a travel application of a Finnish correspondent was treated as that of a journalist's from a socialist country - although the mistake was soon noticed and the permit was eventually granted.

The CSCE has not really had very much effect on the restrictions in Great Britain; regulations concerning travelling of foreign journalists have by and large remained unchanged since 1971. As a matter of fact, in 1981, after Poland declared a state of war in the country, the restrictions were tightened somewhat. Soviet correspondents had previously been permitted to travel freely 35 miles from their base; now, the distance is 25 miles.

In general, Soviet and other Eastern journalists complain not so much about official discrimination, but rather about the difficulties caused by an atmosphere of growing anti-socialism in the West.

Sudden Deadlock

If we are to judge it by journalists' personal experiences, the attempts to follow the Helsinki letter - it is hardly worth mentioning the spirit - began to falter already towards the end of 1976, and certainly by 1977. No new migitations concerning journalists were initiated after the agreements on bilateral visas.

Detente between the superpowers was growing weaker, and this too had an obvious impact on the working conditions of journalists. In many CSCE countries visa applications and accreditation procedures became more complicated. Many journalists were banned from their work, and were deported from their countries of residence - something that had not happened for several years.

For example, not one journalist had been deported from the Soviet Union since December 1973, but in February 1977 an American AP correspondent received orders to leave the country. His deportation was caused by articles about dissidents in the Soviet Union, a subject that had been central in the human rights campaign of the newly elected President of the United States, Jimmy Carter. The US retaliated by deporting a Washington-based correspondent of the Soviet news agency TASS.

Unfortunately, in counter-deportations little consideration is usually given to the fact that journalists represent their media, not their countries. The last obvious counter-deportation has been that of a Moscow-based English reporter in April 1983: Great Britain had earlier deported two Soviet diplomats and one reporter. On the other hand, counter-deportation may also have a restraining effect on deportations on the whole.

In January 1977 a Soviet correspondent in Norway was asked to leave the country - he was not actually deported. In June 1977 Italy rejected a visa application of a Soviet journalist who was coming to report on the elections. In November 1979 Poland deported a Swedish female reporter.[6]

The strained atmosphere was evident in the criticism of Western journalists in the Soviet media. In Czechoslovakia, authorities especially scrutinized activities of those foreign reporters who had been in touch with the intellectual dissidents who had signed the Charter 77.

Even in Yugoslavia, which is generally known for its more liberal attitude to Western media, it was argued that the media in the West were promoting anti-Yugoslavian campaign on the basis of human rights issues.

In June 1977, on the first day of preparations for the follow-up meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia deported a Danish reporter who had been in contact with a women's group which protested against the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union.

In June 1977 Bulgaria did not allow all interested reporters to be present at the Writers' Conference in Sofia, even though one of the topics of the meeting was the Helsinki Final Act.

At least three West German reporters were deported from the GDR during 1975-1978. The GDR Foreign Ministry also turned down an appeal by DJV, the biggest journalist association in the FRG and its West Berlin branch, for more freedom of travel for West German correspondents in "East Berlin and the GDR" (a phrase indicating the Western attitude towards the position of Berlin). West German reporters wanted to do away with regulations according to which they were required to file a separate application for each trip. In many instances permission was slow to come or it was not granted at all.

Four Swedish reporters were arrested in Turkey in January 1977 and deported from the country.

In 1977 Great Britain turned down a visa application by Hungarian reporter who wanted to be present at a NATO meeting and to report on President Carter's visit to London. For the last twenty years this reporter has been allowed to be present at similar NATO meetings without any restrictions.

In the spring of 1980, just before the elections in Zimbabwe -Rhodesia, the British government rejected visa applications of TASS and Izvestija reporters, and in the same year denied entrance of Soviet journalists to Northern Ireland.

While the above is of course not an exhaustive list, it suffices to show the definite growth of restrictions on the working conditions of journalists.

New Boom

The unfavourable trend in development which continued even after the meagre follow-up meeting in Belgrade gradually began to turn into a more promising course. There was some improvement in US-Soviet relations, which was clearly evidenced by the meeting of the leaders of the two countries in Vienna and by the signing of the SALT II Treaty. Although the Treaty was never ratified, it gave some clear guidelines for the years to come. The United States and the Soviet Union also started negotiations on the revival of cultural exchange. In this connection the question about the withdrawal of travel restrictions was also mentioned.

The 1980 Olympic Games, staged in Lake Placid and Moscow, also held a promise of freer working conditions for journalists. From the autumn of 1979 onwards American TV and other mass media had more programmes and articles about the Soviet Union and the everyday life of Soviet people.

Afghanistan...

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan put an end to the promising development, however. The Carter Administration applied a number of sanctions against the Soviet Union, notably the US boycott of the Moscow Games and the drastic

decrease in grain exports to the Soviet Union. The setback in cultural development received perhaps less attention, but it certainly made prospects bleaker for the improvement of the working conditions of journalists.

The measures taken by the Carter Administration to limit reporting from the Moscow Games was a hard blow to the Soviets. Carter recommended that broadcasting companies banned the Games altogether, but obviously the fact that American sportsmen were out of the Games had already lessened the interest of the American public.

Just before the Moscow Games the Soviet Union had opened automatic telephone connections between its major cities and foreign countries. Making their work much easier and speedier, reporters were particularly pleased with this improvement. A few years later, however, the lines were closed down due to what were called technical problems, and it seems unlikely that they will be reopened within the foreseeable future.

...Poland

When assessing the results of the CSCE, the events in Poland during the last few years are amongst the most interesting ones. The US Congress Committee (1976) on the implementation of the CSCE states in its report that, besides Hungary, Poland before the state of war in 1981 made a considerably better impression than the other Warsaw Pact countries. It was noted that Poland had observed almost all the recommendations and obligations regarding the working conditions of journalists. When the Polish-born Pope paid his first visit to Poland in the summer of 1979, the committee's report states that the only mistake was the high "accrediation fee" to the journalists (the fee was partly withdrawn, though).

During the 1980 strikes and in the early days of Solidarity, foreign reporters flowed into Poland; Polish authorities, however, generally took a positive attitude towards the journalists, and few incidents were reported where journa-

lists had difficulties in entering the country - although admittedly when the inflow was at its height even some Finnish reporters were turned back. There were only sporadic travel restrictions within the country. For example, a reporter arriving in Cracow might have been instructed to return to Warsaw.

The lack of automatic telephone connections from Poland to most other countries has been a constant technical problem, although direct dialling is possible from Finland to Poland, for example. In practice this has not been a very serious problem, because the Press Bureau of the Foreign Ministry has always helped with telephone calls, and permanent correspondents get their calls both at home and at work more quickly than normally.

At the beginning of the states of martial law (technically, that was more what the situation resembled in Poland rather than the state of war), Polish authorities sensored all news reports before they were sent abroad, and even later journalists were informed that their telephone call were being listened to. Apart from the residential correspondents, the first foreign reporters were allowed to enter Poland in February-March 1982. At first, there were restrictions regarding their journeys in the country, but as the state of war continued restrictions were lessened step by step. The author has two personal experiences of this (two reporting trips to Poland in 1982).

One of the permanent results of the state of war in Poland was that visas became obligatory to Finnish journalists as well.
When Pope John Paul visited Poland for the second time in June 1983, Finnish reporters were annoyed by the strikingly high percentage of rejected visa applications: 53 applications of the total of 796 were turned down, some 7 per cent. It seems that in international comparison the share of turned down Finnish journalists was much larger than in any other country.[7]

After this incident it has been easier for Finnish reporters to travel to Poland, and in the autumn of 1984 the handling of visa applications became faster. An obvious drawback is still the fact that visa applications of journalists, in contrast to those of others, are dealt with in Warsaw.

In the winter of 1983 a UPI correspondent was deported from Poland, which however was most probably an indication of the worsening US-Polish relations rather than a change in the country's general policy towards journalists. As a counter-measure the US deported a correspondent of the Polish news agency PAP. In just a couple of months both news agencies sent new people to replace the deported journalists.

Nowadays, there are hardly any restrictions to the work of journalists in Poland. Pierre Salinger, Editor-in-Chief for the American ABC television network, previously Press Manager for President John F. Kennedy, stated his appreciation about this at the international meeting of journalists near Warsaw in November 1984. In his opinion criticism towards Poland had clearly been too harsh.

Political changes in two other CSCE countries have also influenced the working conditions of journalists. After the death of Francisco Franco democratic rule in Spain brought freedom of press and removed a number of restrictions which had formerly hampered the work of journalists.

The development in Turkey has been in the opposite direction. After the military coup in 1980 the press has been under strict control, and there has been little improvement in the situation although the country has partly returned to democratic government. Authorities have threatened and harassed many Turkish reporters who assist foreign news media, and for example a Turkish correspondent working for the news agency UPI has not been given an exit visa.

Substantion and Clarification

The Madrid follow-up meeting substantiated and clarified to

a great extent the Helsinki Final Act also in matters regarding the working conditions of journalists. Improvements included annual multiple entry visas to journalists' close families and the granting of visas to correspondents from third countries. The latter concerns amongst others the previously mentioned correspondents based in Vienna or East European countries.

In practice it has become clear that stipulations would be needed to ensure that journalists be treated in the same way as tourists from the same country. In many cases it has been much more difficult for a journalist than for a normal tourist or businessman to get a visa for a holiday trip. After Madrid some measures to this effect have been taken, and e.g. in Czechoslovakia journalists travelling for tourist purposes only are granted entry visas within 14 days with the same validity and length of stay.

However, it must be admitted that the Madrid recommendations have not had a very significant impact. Most journalists interviewed by the author have noticed no changes whatsoever, and the same idea is confirmed by a representative of the British Foreign Office. On the other hand, the procedure for granting multiple entry visas has long been in conformity with the Madrid recommendations.

However, there have been some promising developments as far as the working conditions of journalists are concerned. For example, in September 1984 TIME commented on the freer communication policy in the Soviet Union, which has resulted in the increase of programmes about the Soviet Union in the US. It is likely, however, that this is simply an indication of a growing awareness about the importance of communication among the authorities. Individual administrators may also contribute to a more positive approach to communication - a fact that experienced reporters have come across in their work as well.

In Conclusion

As regards the development of the working conditions of journalists, it may be noted that the CSCE is intimately bound up with political development in general and in individual countries in particular. On the other hand there is no reason to underestimate the achievements of the CSCE.

Without the CSCE the basis of journalists' work would be uch more insecure. The recommendations given by the CSCE can to some extent be compared with the general agreement concerning diplomatic rights. Today, journalists can expect to be treated according to certain rules in their base of work and on their working trips. In addition, even minor improvements in working conditions mean that journalists can ever more concentrate on what they are supposed to be doing - news communication. This can only be achieved if they do not constantly have to overcome bureaucratic obstacles.

NOTES

1. The Helsinki Final Act, Finnish edition, pages 69-71.
2. E.G. a lecture by Erkki Pennanen at the CSCE Seminar of Journalists in Hanasaari, 4 Feb. 1976, and the memorandum of IPJ, the International Federation of Journalists, presented to the Belgrade follow-up meeting in June 1977.
3. This information is based mainly on the author's personal discussion with correspondents in different countries.
4. Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Five Years after Helsinki. Report submitted to the Congress of the United States by the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, August 1, 1980. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., pp. 251-253.
5. IPJ memorandum (1977)

6. IPJ memorandum. The report submitted to the Congress of the United States to the CSCE Commission covering the period between 1 December 1976 and 1 July 1977, pp. 23 - 24.

7. Interview of a representative of the Polish Embassy, Aamulehti, 17 June 1983.

ZOLTÁN JAKAB

TELEVISION PROGRAMMES ON OFFER IN SOME EUROPEAN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

In the autumn of 1983, the Director-General of UNESCO presented the results of a world-wide mass communication survey covering about 50 countries to the General Assembly. The title of the survey sounds innocent: The international flow of television programmes and news. In fact, major storms and degates could be expected to follow the research report, because it covered a conspicuous case of world-wide communication inequalities and disproportions. For example, about the role of a few developed capitalist countries dominating the world market of television programmes. Exactly about those countries who are the most militant representatives of the principle of the "free flow of information", while they belong to those markets, which are most closed to television programmes from abroad.

When writing this article, the survey had not been completed, nevertheless, the outcome can already be seen. In fact, the research is the repetition of a similar survey of 1973[1] and in fact there was not much change in the world during the past ten years with regard to the international traffic of television programmes.

For the survey, organized and carried out during hardly more than a year, the world was divided into 8 regions, and in these areas one or two research institutes co-ordinated the work of the participants. In the "East Europe" region UNESCO invited the Mass Communication Research Centre, Budapest, to play the role of co-ordinator, and research institutes in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R., and in the Soviet Union participated in the survey.

This cooperation is a welcome- and regrettably rare - occasion to compare a few characteristic features in the television of the European socialist countries, based on data collected according to a unified system. Although the survey only covered a two-week period (January 31 - February 13),

the participants agreed that this period in general correctly reflected the usual programme schedule of the individual countries.

Transmission time

The survey included the national programmes, namely, in general two programmes in each country. In Czechoslovakia the data collection covered the federal and the Czech and Slovak programmes.

Major differences appeared in the weekly average transmission times. The Czechoslovak Television (CSTV) transmitted 195 hours, the Soviet Television (STV) 184 hours during one week. The corresponding data of the G.D.R. Television (DDRTV) was 135 hours, that of the Hungarian Television (MTV) 98, and that of the Bulgarian Television (BTV) only 93 hours. Because of the difference in the number of transmission days and of the examined programmes, the average quantity of transmitted programmes on one channel and in one transmission day is a better index. Accordingly, the largest offer was provided by the STV with 13.1 hours, that of the CSTV and of the DDRTV were similar (9.3 and 9.6 hours respectively), while the MTV transmitted 8.1 and the BTV 6.1 hours. To explain the outstanding long transmission time of the Soviet Television, the dimensions of the country have to be taken into consideration together with the many time zones it belongs to, which means that the actually received quantity of programmes in the different areas of the country is lower than the duration of the transmissions.

Programme supply

During the survey, the content and functions of the programmes were categorized according to the system approved by a UNESCO conference of government experts in 1976. The categorization of the programmes was promoted by useful definitions, which did not exclude the possibility of different categorization of identical programmes, but considerably reduced it. (Differing evaluation particularly appeared in the

"cultural" and "entertainment" categories and somewhat influenced the ratios of the "informative" and "educational" categories. All in all, it seems that the categories were sufficiently unified to sensibly compare the national data. (See Table 1.)

The structures of the complete programming of the five socialist countries differ to a considerable extent. The proportion of the informative programmes is rather high in the BTV and STV, almost 30 per cent, while the counter-pole is represented by the DDR and the MTV with less than 20 per cent. The proportion of the educational programmes is uniquely high in the MTV, the same refers to the cultural programmes of the MTV, and STV. The BTV screens the largest number of children's programmes, while the ratio of entertainment programmes is by far the highest in the DDRTV. (In the Hungarian Television, the ratio of entertainment programmes did not come up to 35 per cent of the complete transmission time, which at the same time meant the smallest proportion. It seems that this ratio was the manifestation of a long existing tendency[2] in the surveyed period.) Naturally, the composition of prime time[3] considerably differs from the general television menu, particularly because of the much lower proportion of educational and juvenile programmes. In general, many more entertainment programmes are screened in the peak viewing time than otherwise (with the exception of the BTV). At the same time, some characteristic features of the countries unambiguously appear in this period. Even in this period, the ratio of informative programmes is very high in the BTV and the STV, it is over 30 per cent. In the MTV, the proportion of cultural programmes is high in this period, almost 20 per cent, while entertainment takes a particularly large proportion in the transmission of the DDRTV. (As compared to 70 per cent in the DDRTV, the relative weight of entertainment programmes in the CSTV and STV is somewhat over 50 per cent, in the MTV under 50 per cent, and in the BTV it is under 40 per cent.)

Table 1
Breakdown of programmes according to categories and countries (in percentage)

Programme category	BTV	CSTV	DDRTV	MTV	STV
Informative	28.5	21.2	17.7	16.4	29.4
Educational	7.6	13.0	8.5	21.0	14.3
Cultural	12.7	12.0	7.6	17.7	15.3
Juvenile	12.2	8.3	9.1	7.1	5.3
Entertainment	38.2	41.4	56.7	34.3	35.6
Others (commercials and miscellaneous)	0.7	4.1	0.4	3.4	0
Total	99.9	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.99

Table 2
The proportion of imported programmes in the schedule, in prime time, according to countries (in percentage)

	BTV	CSTV	DDRTV	MTV	STV
Complete schedule	27.4	23.8	30.3	26.5	8.1
Prime time schedule	20.7	24.9	39.4	35.2	17.7

In the entire offer of entertainment programmes, there is a considerable difference between the individual television networks with regard to the percentage of drama and music materials. In the CSTV and MTV almost 60 per cent of entertainment consists of cinema films, teleplays and TV series (while in the case of the other three countries, the proportion varies between 50-56 per cent). The relative proportion of music programmes in the entertainment offer of the BTV and STV is very large: 20 and 26 per cent respectively (in contrast to the 11-15 per cent of the other three countries).

Imported programmes

The proportions of imported programmes are almost similar and it is a general feature that more imported programmes are screened in prime time than at any other time. (See

Table 2.)

Compared to the 1973 survey, it seems that the ratio of imported programmes increased in the DDR, MTV, and STV, while there was a considerable reduction in the case of the BTV. Naturally, programming policy, production capacities, and financial possibilities play - even if not to the same extent - the most important role in the extent of the imports. This is most clearly and most convincingly illustrated by the proportion of imported programmes within all entertainment transmissions. The outstanding proportion of imports is not so obvious in any other category. 18 per cent of the entertainment on the STV, 44 per cent and 41 per cent in the BTV and CSTV, 50 per cent in the DDRTV and 57 per cent in the MTV is of foreign origin. (The MTV data reflect a 10-15 year long tendency, as it was shown by earlier full surveys.[4]

Table 3

Imported programmes according to their sources and countries (in percentages)

	BTV	CSTV	DDRTV	MTV	STV
European socialist countries	68.7	49.5	50.9	15.5	29.6
Other socialist countries	-	1.6	-	-	6.4
Western Europe	29.4	39.2	45.3	67.6	55.3
North America	-	4.3	3.8	16.8	5.6
Other countries	1.8	5.4	-	-	3.1
Total	99.9	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0

With regard to the entire region, the STV is the most significant source of imports: more than 20 per cent of imported materials originate from there. (The proportion of Soviet programmes is higher than average in the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak schedule.) There is a considerable proportion of West German, French, British, and US programmes in the schedule of the region - altogether about 40 per cent.

(With regard to the role of the F.R.G. it should be noted that the European Skating Championship at Düsseldorf took place during the surveyed period, which made the ratio of West German materials much higher than the average in almost every country which participated in the research.) The list of imports continues - with practically identical proportions - with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the G.D.R., altogether with about 13 per cent. During the surveyed period, the examined television organizations screened programmes from altogether 26 countries, not including coproductions with foreign countries.

However, consdierable differences can be seen in the different countries of the region with regard to the import orientation. (See Table 3.)

With regard to the ratio of the import structure, the non-representative character of the surveyed period undoubtedly showed its effect. For example, in the Hungarian programme imports, usually the ratio of programmes produced by the European socialist countries is much higher, almost half of all programme imports. At the same time, it is obvious that the television market of the surveyed countries can hardly be considered a closed market surrounded by protectionist bastions.

Footnotes

1 See: Nordenstreng, K. and Varis, T.: Television Traffic: A One-Way Street? Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 70. UNESCO, 1974.

2 Prime time is not identical in the different countries. In the BTV and STV, the period between 19.00 and 23.00 is considered prime time - based on the viewing customs -, in the other 3 countries the data refer to the period from 19.30 to 21.30-22.00.

3 See "Tömegkommunikációs adattár". Vol. II., pp. 52-53. MCRC. Budapest, 1978.

4 See: Jakab Z. - Losonczi I.: Importmisorok a képernyőn 1962-73. MCRC., 1973 (mimeo).

DORIS RIEDEL/HEINZ ODERMANN

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE MASS MEDIA IN THE CAMPAIGN FOR ARMS LIMITATION, DISARMAMENT AND PEACE

I.

Information and communication have for a long time been a constituent part of international relations. The qualitative changes currently under way in the field of information and communication technology are bringing along a profound transformation in the material conditions for the production, dissemination and reception of international information currents. These developments mean that international information and communication are having a formative influence on the system of international relations. The media of mass communication's responsibility for the course and character of international relations grows to the extent they can help determine the direction and content of these relations by making an impact on international public opinion. In this sense, too, the problems involved in international information and communication are taking on a global scale.

II.

International relations at their current stage are marked by an alarming aggravation of political tensions between the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO alliances. Against the background of the development military technology has undergone in the past decade, this process is drifting towards a critical point at which events could become uncontrollable. War has ceased to be an instrument of achieving political aims. It follows that the most pressing task in international relations is to curb the arms race on earth and prevent it from spreading into outer space.

III.

In no other region of the world has there ever been such a high concentration of lethal weapons as in Central Europe

at the present time. This fact puts a special responsibility on the two German states, located as they are in the centre of this zone and at the fragile divide between the two military blocs, to bring about a turn in international relations. They are bound by responsibility because of their past experiences in two world wars that emanated from German soil.

IV.

Realities call for radical rethinking. Everything must be subjected to re-examination in a world living under threat of extinction. Being major channels of information and thought communication between the systems, the mass media should view it as their international mission to achieve an irreversible breakthrough for the idea that there can be no justification for all-devastating nuclear war. We consider it necessary in the border and, more importantly, system-transcending contest of ideas, a substantial part of which is going on through the mass media, to switch from rivalry to dialogue, from confrontation to communication and mutually enriching exchange, from wars of words to peace-promoting intellectual emulation. Radio and TV, the press and the news agencies can go a long way towards enhancing peace, towards shaping a healthy and trusting climate in the international community and promoting fruitful cultural exchange as long as they exercise restraint in choosing their means and methods and do not become an instrument of disinformation.

V.

If "wars begin in the minds of man" and if "it is in the minds of man that the defences of peace must be constructed" (UNESCO Constitution), then it is a political and moral imperative for the mass media to contribute on grounds of humanitarian responsibility towards warding off the threat of war. This moral obligation demands that the mass media, regardless of their ideological positions, denomination and socio-political concepts, join in a worldwide effort to create a body of international public opinion conducive to

the termination of the arms race and the transition to disarmament. This would be helpful in searching for ways of escaping from the labyrinth of differences prone to drive the world into a nuclear war.
Radio, TV and the press in the German Democratic Republic feel committed to this concern. They act as a mouthpiece for all initiatives aimed at arms limitation and disarmament, supporting all ideas and proposals that serve the establishment of a system of collective security.

VI.

Freedom of opinion and the media, bourgeois and socialist democracy presuppose the maintenance of peace. Given this, the duty of the mass media to contribute towards peace and disarmament education and the development of international communication are mutually dependent. This duty complies with the information and education mission codified for the mass media in many countries.

VII.

Each side has its values which it strives to preserve and enrich. The debate about these values, the intellectual debate on the advantages and drawbacks of one or the other view of society should be conducted in a climate of trust, i.e. in a matter-of-fact way and without hurtful polemic; it should be critical and yet receptive to every new, positive idea in international relations. Ideological discussions in the mass media should always retain the ability for cooperation. We deem this to be the crux of ideological competition.

VIII.

The dissemination of false news and deliberate disinformation is incompatible with ideological competition between opposing social systems and ideologies. Disinformation is not compatible with the notion of international law. Ideological competition does not offer any room for incitement to racial hatred, religious intolerance, national arrogance, xenopho-

bia, violence and aggression. They are manifestations of psychological warfare and stand for one of its components, i.e. ideological subversion. These phenomena should be described as illegal and unacceptable. What is needed here is not "government censorship" but personal sincerity and a feeling of responsibility on the part of journalists, publishers, media and communication scientists.

IX.

The conviction that there is a possibility of turning international information and communication relations into an arena of confidence-building dialogue marked by common sense and realism is, among other things, based on past experiences gathered in the "century of the mass media". Their history is rich in examples of brave action launched by journalists and publicists from a wide spectrum of political forces against the arms build-up, psychological war preparations and wars of aggression. (Suffice it to recall the name of Emile Zola, Carl von Ossietzky, Kurt Tucholsky, Erich Maria Remarque, Ernest Hemingway, Thomas Mann, Jean Jaurès, Rabindranath Tagore, Pablo Neruda, Ernesto Cardinale and Augustino Neto or the role played by the BBC, Radio Moscow, Radio Hilversum and other broadcasting stations in organizing resistance during Nazi rule.) Committed to the same tradition are, without any doubt, the campaign launched by papers such as Le Monde against the colonial wars in Vietnam and Algeria as well as the activities undertaken by large sections of the US media during the Vietnam war and, later on, in popularizing the Freeze movement.

X.

One contribution the communication sciences could make to enhance such trends is to place more emphasis in the framework of communication policy research on the problems involved in interaction between the media and disarmament. We deem the following fields of research to be of primary importance in this context:

1. deliberations concerning a universal "Charter of mass communication" in the era of nuclear weapons;
2. fundamental principles for the work of the mass media in East-West relations;
3. fundamental principles for the work of the mass media in North-South relations;
4. analysis of the structure and content of major mass media which have at their disposal a vast potential to make a positive or negative impact on international relations;
5. research into the history of the media with emphasis on positive examples of mass media and journalists committing themselves to peace that are worth emulating;
6. case studies of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy;
7. elaboration of criteria to be applied to analyses of the content of issues concerning peace and disarmament;
8. linguistic and stylistic studies of the impact language patterns and thought stereotypes etc. make on the development of military rationale.

List of authors

Mr. Frank-Michael Bahr	Communications researcher and consultant, Frankfurt
Dr. Hans-Joachim Heintze	Institute for International Studies, KMU
Dr. Zoltán Jakab	Centre of Mass Communication Research, Budapest
Dr. Wolfgang Kleinwächter	Institute for International Studies, KMU
Dr. Emil Konstantinov	Faculty of Law, University Sofia
Prof. Yrjö Littunen	Research Institute for Social Sciences, University of Tampere
Mr. Oiva Miettinen	Journalist, Tampere
Prof. Kaarle Nordenstreng	Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Tampere
Dr. Heinz Odermann	Institute for International Relations, Academy for Political Science and Jurisprudence, Potsdam-Babelsberg
Prof. Walter Poeggel	Institute for International Studies, KMU
Mr. Hannsgerd Protsch	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR
Dr. Falko Raaz	Institute for International Studies, KMU
Prof. Lothar Rathmann	Rector of the Karl Marx University of Leipzig
Dr. Doris Riedel	Institute for International Relations, Academy for Political Science and Jurisprudence, Potsdam-Babelsberg
Ms. Tarja Seppä	Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Tampere
Mr. Wolfgang Ullmann	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR
Dr. Tapio Varis	Rector of the UN University for Peace, Costa Rica

TAMPEREEN YLIOPISTO
Tiedotusopin laitos

Lokakuu 1986

Julkaisut 1980—

(Julkaisuja on ilmestynyt vuodesta 1969 lähtien)

Sarja A, ISSN 0358-4585

44/1981 Kim Weckström: PÄÄLAELLEEN KÄÄNNETTY TIETOISUUS. Lisensiaattitutkimus. **Painos lopussa.**

45/1981 Erkki Lehtilä & Kari Tyni: SANANVAPAUS IHMISOIKEUTENA.

46/1983 Merja Saarikoski: VIESTINTÄIMPERIALISMIN TEORIAN KRITIIKKIÄ ERITYISESTI HERBERT I. SCHILLERIN AJATUSMUOTOJEN KRITIIKKINÄ. Pro gradu -tutkielma. 22 mk.

47/1983 Ilkka Rentola: NORMAALIJOURNALISMIN SÄÄNNÖT. Yhdysvaltalaisen journalismin oppikirjallisuuden esittämän ideaalityypin tarkastelua. Pro gradu -tutkielma.

48/1983 Pertti Alasuutari & Jorma Siltari: TYÖVÄESTÖ JA TELEVISIO. Sivulaudaturtutkielma.

49/1983 Seppo Aura: PALUU AKTIVOIVAAN ELOKUVAAN JA TELEVISIOON.

50/1983 Voitto Ruohonen: TIETO JA YHTEISYYS. Pro gradu -tutkielma.

51/1984 Hannu Nieminen: OBJEKTIIVISEN JA UUDEN JOURNALISMIN TODELLISUUSKÄSITYKSISTÄ. Pohdintoja journalististen teorioitten ympäriltä. Sivulaudaturtutkielma. 32 mk

52/1985 Pertti Julkunen: LUOKAT, HEGEMONIA JA SANOMALEHTI. Tutkielma Leninin julkisuuskäsityksistä ja journalistisista pyrkimyksistä 1899—1914. Pro gradu -tutkielma. 29 mk.

53/1985 Juha Lehtinen & Tapani Luotola: MATKA INFORMAATIOYHTEISKUNTAAN. Pro gradu -tutkielma. 43 mk.

54/1986 Jorma Mäntylä: ANTONIO GRAMSCI, HEGEMONIA JA JOURNALISMI. Lisensiaattitutkielma. 29 mk.

Sarja B, ISSN 0358-4151

1/1980 Taisto Hujanen: THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE REALIZATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS. **Painos lopussa.**

2/1980 Juhani Wiio: YHTEISKUNNAN RAKENNEMUUTOS JA TELEVISIO. Lyhennelmä lisensiaattitutkimuksesta.

3/1981 Leena Paldán & Kauko Pietilä (toim.): KANSALLINEN KULTTUURI. Kollokvioraportti. **Painos lopussa.**

4/1981 Heikki Hellman: AJATUSTEN MARSHALL-SUUNNITELMA. Katsaus 'kansainvälisen viestinnän' tutkimuksen kehityspiirteisiin ja sosiaalitekno-logisoitumiseen. **Painos lopussa.**

5/1981 Pirkko-Liisa Kastari: ANTTI CHYDENIUS JA PAINOVAPAUDEN AA-TE. Sivulaudaturtutkielma.

6/1981 Jyrki Pietilä: MUTKAN KAUTTA SUORAAN. Suomalaisen talouselämän suhdetoiminnan ja sen esimuotojen historiaa. Lyhennelmä lisensiaattitutki-muksesta. 18,80 mk.

7/1982 Leena Paldán & Kauko Pietilä (toim.): KULTTUURISEMINAARI SNELLMAN 1981. Seminaariraportti.

8/1982 SOCIAL ROLE OF MASS COMMUNICATION. Report of the second Finnish-Soviet seminar. **Painos lopussa.**

9/1983 Pertti Hemánus & Taisto Hujanen (red.): JOURNALISTIK UNDER FÖR-VANDLING. Nordiska journalistlärarseminariet på Murikka 9—12 augusti 1982. Slutrapport. 14,50 mk.

10/1983 Tarmo Malmberg: ELOKUVAN KULTTUURIHISTORIAN PÄÄPIIR-TEET. 23 mk.

11/1984 Kauko Pietilä (ed.): STUDIES OF COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA IN FINLAND. STATE OF THE ART.

12/1984 Taisto Hujanen (ed.): THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE REALIZATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS: REPORT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, TAMPERE 19—22 JUNE 1983.

13/1984 CITY — WAY OF LIFE — MASS COMMUNICATION. Report of the third Finnish-Soviet seminar on problems of mass communication re-search.

14/1984 Tapio Varis: FLOW OF TELEVISION PROGRAMMES IN WESTERN EUROPE. Summary of the basic data during January 31—February 13, 1983.

15/1984 Tarmo Malmberg: JOURNALISMIKRITIIKKI. 34 mk.

16/1985 TWO SEMINARS ON IPDC. 13 mk.

17/1985 Lars Furhoff & Pertti Hemánus: NEW DIRECTIONS IN JOURNALISM RESEARCH.

18/1986 Taisto Hujanen (ed.): THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE REALIZATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS. 22 mk.

Sarja C, ISSN 0358-4593

1/1981 Kauko Pietilä: JOURNALISMIN KRITIIKIN MAHDOLLISUUKSIA. Kuusi kirjoitusta vuosilta 1978—1981. 6,70 mk. **Painos lopussa.**

2/1981 Tarmo Malmberg: VIESTINTÄ JA KULTTUURI. Tekstejä viestinnän teorian ja tutkimuksen kulttuuriteoreettisista perusteista (1978—81). 12,90 mk. **Painos lopussa.**

3/1982 Veikko Pietilä: TIEDOTUSTUTKIMUS: TEITÄ JA TIENVIITTOJA. 23 mk.

4/1984 Tarmo Malmberg: VIESTINNÄN TEORIA JA TUTKIMUS. Tekstejä, 1981—1984. 26 mk.

6/1984 Matti Kinnunen: ASPECTS OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPER JOURNALISM. 6 mk.

7/1985 Kaarle Nordenstreng (toim.): 60 VUOTTA TOIMITTAJAKOULUTUSTA. II painos. 44 mk.

8/1986 Pertti Hemánus & Ilkka Tervonen: VAIHTOEHTOJOURNALISMI, MINKÄLAINEN VAIHTOEHTO? 7 mk.

Sarja D, ISSN 0358-4607

36/1983 Pertti Korpinen & Osmo Uosukainen: RADIO- JA TV-TEKNIIKAN PERUSTEET. **Painos lopussa.**

37/1985 VIESTINTÄPOLIITTISIA KANNANOTTOJA. 35 mk.

38/1986 Kari Ilmonen & Heikki Nikulin: UUSI VIESTINTÄTEKNIIKKA. 14 mk.

39/1986 Veikko Pietilä (toim.): KULTTUURI, KIELI, VIESTINTÄ. 14 mk.

Sarja E, ISSN 0358-4615

1/1981 SUOMALAISEN TIEDOTUSTUTKIMUKSEN BIBLIOGRAFIA VI. 21,40 mk.

2/1982 SUOMALAISEN TIEDOTUSTUTKIMUKSEN BIBLIOGRAFIA VII. 19,60 mk.

3/1983 SUOMALAISEN TIEDOTUSTUTKIMUKSEN BIBLIOGRAFIA VIII. 37,10 mk.

4/1984 SUOMALAISEN TIEDOTUSTUTKIMUKSEN BIBLIOGRAFIA IX. 36 mk.

5/1985 Maija Jussilainen (toim.): TIEDOTUSOPPIA KIRJASTOISSA JA TIETOKANNOISSA. Luettelo kirjastoista, kausijulkaisuista ja tietokannoista. 23 mk.

6/1985 SUOMALAISEN TIEDOTUSTUTKIMUKSEN BIBLIOGRAFIA X. 37 mk.

7/1986 COMMUNICATION RESEARCH INSTITUTES IN FINLAND 1986.

8/1986 TIEDOTUSTUTKIMUSTA JA VIESTINNÄN TUTKIMUSTA HARJOITTAVIA LAITOKSIA SUOMESSA. 24 mk.

139

Julkaisuja, joihin on merkitty hinta, myyvät

— Tampereen yliopisto/julkaisujen myynti, PL 617, 33101 Tampere, puh. 931-156 055

— Juvenes Oy/Yliopiston paperikauppa, Kalevantie 4, 33100 Tampere, puh. 931-218 18